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In the critique of Ludwig Feuerbach's identifica
tion of the nature of man and of the nature of God,
it is
seen that his ideas stem from some aspects of Hegelian
philosophy.

Feuerbach's thought revolves around his con-

ception of man.

He believed, after much study, that he

perceived in Hegelian philosophy a portrait of man that
was veiled by Hegel's mystical concept of Absolute Mind.
If, Feuerbach thought, one could strip away the ideal
istic
tendencies of Hegelianism, then one would be left with a
true picture of man.

He reversed Hegelian thought and re-

postulated man in his "Towards a Critique of Hegelian
Philosophy."

He concluded that man was a being that pos-

sessed the qualities of Reason, Will, and Affection.
Although Feuerbach believed that Hegelianism was a
serious cause of man's alienation from himself and other
men,
he felt even more strongly that Christianity was the
most
prominent cause of this alienation.
to criticize Christianity.

Therefore, he proceeded

In 1842 he published his great-

est work, The Essence of Christianity.

In that work Feuer-

bach attempted to illustrate the essence of the Chris
tian
religion.

He sought to save those parts of religion that he

considered to be true.

These parts were the human quali-

ties--Reason, Will, and Affection--which men had predicated
to God.

He also tried to demonstrate that if man considered

the predicates of God and of man as separated, he would
become entangled in contradiction.

Feuerbach concluded

that God was a man-made projection of the essence of the
human species.
Feuerbach made his claims because he misunderstood
the nature of man.

If one seriously studies twentieth

century man, one is forced to deny Feuerbach his presuppostions.

Once Feuerbach's view of man is shown to be

false, his conception of the existence of God and of man as
the same being is also invalidated.

INTRODUCTION
Ludwig Feuerbach was a nineteenth century German
philosopher educated in Berlin under the celebrated philosopher Hegel.

For a brief period in the 1840s he was

on the center stage of German philosophy.

This study is

an attempt to take a close look at the philosophical work
of Feuerbach and to evaluate it's strengths and weaknesses.
Why even bother with Ludwig Feuerbach?

Why be

concerned with his place in the history of philosophy?
His influence on Karl Marx surely is one reason, but
there is more to the substance of Feuerbach's work than
just his influence on Marx and the other young revolutionaries of the mid-nineteenth century.

He can also

be studied in connection with the rise of existentialism in Germany as well as with the development of the
field of the psychology of religion.

1

Feuerbach's

importance, moreover, is not limited to his historical
contribution.

One can see a remnant of Feuerbach's con-

cept of man in the social humanists and existential
1

Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the
Intellectual Development of Karl Marx (New York: The
Humanities Press, 1950; reprint ed., 1958), p. 221.

2
Marxists of today's bourgeoisie revolutionaries.2

One

can see Feuerbach's 'man' in the "Humanist Manifesto II, "
which was authored by Paul Kurtz and was signed by over
one hundred scientists, philosophers, and religious
leaders.3 However, before one can look at Feuerbach's
influence on Marxism, existentialism, psychology of religion or today's bourgeoisie revolutionaires,
one must look at Feuerbach himself.

I believe

It is only fair to

Feuerbach for one to make an effort to evaluate him on
what he was attempting to do, and on what he succeeded
in doing to the philosophy of his time.
Feuerbach spent most of his adult life attempting
to return man to man.

Hegelian philosophy, according to

Feuerbach, alienated man from himself.

The same was also

true, he believed,of Christian religion and theology.
Feuerbach attempted to eliminate all doctrines and ideologies that sought, consciously or unconsciously, to divinize or diabolize natural or human things.4 He attempted
to eliminate these doctrines and ideologies, not by
building a positive system of philosophy, but rather,negatively by trying to enlighten mankind to the mistake it
'Eugene Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 151.
3Paul Kurtz,
ed., "Humanist Manifesto II," The
Humanist 33:5 (September/October 1973): 4-8.
4

William B. Chamberlain, Heaven Wasn't His Destination: The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 19 1), p. 24.

3
had made in understanding what its real essence was.
In order to understand Feuerbach one must realize
what was taking place in the discipline of philosophy
prior to his own writings.

As Feuerbach himself believed,

philosophical systems and thought were products of
their
times.

Philosophies grew out of an already existing

thought level.5

The period which immediately preceded

Feuerbach can be viewed from two different perspectiv
es:
the religious and philosophical ideas of the late
eighteenth century, and the religious and philosophical
thought
of the first two decades of the nineteenth century.

All

that is possible at this point is a brief and somew
hat
simplified overlook, but such an assessment will never
theless prove helpful.
Although it was in the sixteenth century that
Copernicus made his proclamation that the planets
revolved
around the sun, it was not until the eighteenth centu
ry
that man realized the full extent of what this conce
pt
meant in regard to man's view of himself.

Man began to

realize that he was not the center of the universe,
but
rather a small part of an extremely large whole.

How did

eighteenth century man react to and deal with the
implications of the Copernican revolution?

According to Karl

Barth, man overcame the initial humiliation of
his situation

5Ludwi

g Feuerbach, The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings
of Ludwig Feuerbach, trans. and introduction by Zawar
flanfi
(Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972), p. 59.
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by making himself, in a completely different way, the center
of the universe once again.

Because man was capable of dis-

covering that the earth revolved around the sun and not the
sun around the earth, he felt that this insight entitled him
to consider himself the intellectual center of the universe.
He replaced the geocentric picture he had of the world with
an anthropocentric view of the world.

This viewpoint led to

the rise of modern science, the era of mechanical invention,
and the exploration of the earth.

It also led to the

creation of such philosophical systemsas rationalism, empiricism, and scepticism.6
Eighteenth century man approached his life and
world with belief in the omnipotence of his own rational
capabilities.
same way.

He also approached Christianity in the

He felt as if he were getting closer to the

essence of Christianity when he treated it as a statement
7
The
on the omnipotence of human beings' own capacities.
late eighteenth century man would not adhere to atheism,
but he felt that the universal power of man reflected the
universal power of God.

In the late eighteenth century

and early nineteenth century there was, especially in
Germany,a move toward Prometheanism, that is, equating man
with God, or at least making man as significant as God.
6Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth
Century: Its Background and History (Valley Forge: Judsol
Press, 1972), p. 38.
7

Ibid., p. 83.
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This movement developed from eighteenth century man's view
of the essence of Christianity as reflecting his own
omnipotence.

Although this movement was incomplete, the

young German philosophers of the early nineteenth century
recognized it in Geothe and Kant.8

Geothe's character

Faust represented this move toward humanism when he discovered, before he died, that he was only satisfied if he
were at the service of mankind.9

Geothe also perceived

and, through his studies and writings, promoted the idea
that man should move away from a Christianity of word and
faith, and move toward a Christianity of works and deeds
that would be beneficial to mankind."

Kant suggested

this Prometheanism when he made the claim that the knower
must impose something onto percepts or experiences before
there was knowledge.

Kant also took this stand in his

Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, where practical
religion depended upon--in fact, was founded by --reason.
Reason dictated the boundaries of mankind, i.e., moral
laws, and God was only necessary for granting rewards to
those who had acted morally.
As eighteenth century man humanized his approach
to Christian theology he incorporated a similar approach
8 Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 6.
9Karl LOwith, From Heel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth -Century Thought, trans. by David E.
Green (New YoiTi Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 29.

10Ibid.

6
toward the state, morality, science and philosophy. 11
The social, political, moral, and scientific man became
important to the eighteenth century intellectual population.

This can be seen in Kant's approach to reason in

The Critique of Pure Reason, where a scientific use of
reason was the only valid use of reason for gaining knowledge, and in his Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, where the moral laws were far more important than
Biblical stories or the Scriptures.
Turning to philosophical developments in the early
nineteenth century, one finds that the idealism of Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel developed from two different needs.
First, there was the direct challenge of the French revolution to restructure the state and society so that it
would have a rational base.12

Second, an attempt was made

to eliminate the dualism between phenomena and noumena
basic to Kant's philosophy)"

It is the latter viewpoint

which is of interest to us here.

Fichte accepted Kantian

philosophy as the true philosophy and tried to give it
scientific objectivity.

In order to achieve this purpose

he had to eliminate Kant's dichotomy between the phenomena
and the noumena.

He accomplished his goal by deriving the

"Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth
Century, p. 85.
12Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and
the Rise of Social Theory, 2nd ed7, supp. (New York:
Humanities Press, 1963), p. 3.
13Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach,p. 7.

phenomena and noumena from the same concept, i.e., mind.14
In Kant's philosophy the mind presented the phenomenal world
by organizing the percepts.

The knower could never know the

percepts, as such, but only as the mind organized them and
then presented them.

What Fichte did was make the indivi-

ual mind, to which Kant referred, into the universal mind.
Fichte's dialectic can be seen as follows:
The mind [universal mind) is first unconsciously active;
it then finds that in this unconscious spontaneous
activity it is limited by the laws of its being; it thus
comes to objectify and project these limitations and
call them an external world ....Only after the mind had
posited such an external world could—TT—Zome to the
consciousness of itself as a mind, since it could only
recognize its qualities by first contrasting itself with
something it takes to be non-mind....Therefore, but only
slowly, the mind comes to recognize that the experiences
it has must be read as its, that the mind alone is the
sphere of its operations, that it is at once subject and
object, the sole and absolute starting point and the
ultimate content of all knowledge which can claim to be
scientific....15
The dialectic's true base had to be, however, logical
It had to be a principle that contained its truth in itself
without any outside help.

Since Fichte wanted to derive the

phenomena and ncumena from the same concept he had to look
for this logically true principle.

Therefore he began his

philosophy with the proposition of identity, i.e., x=x when
x represented the same thing in both cases.

However, it was

important to know whether or not x actually existed.
could one be sure existed, asked Fichte?

Ego!

What

Mind.

14Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 73.
15Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 8.

Therefore Fichte based his philosophy on "Ego=Ego."16
Out of this principle of identity, Ego=Ego, Fichte developed
two related ideas: one, the principle of negative, i.e.,
non -Ego is not equal to Ego or more generally non -x is not
equal to x; and two, the principle of limitation.

The

principle of limitation was a deduction from his previous
principles.

It said that x is limited by non -x, and non -x

is limited by x.17

Fichte's three principles could be seen

as corresponding to Kant's three types of judgements:
affirmation, negation, and limitation.

There was also a

close connection between them and Hegel's idea of thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis. 18
The importance of Fichte's dialectic to this study
is that Hegel developed it in the Phenomenology of Mind.
Moreover, it was this part of Hegel's philosophy that he
borrowed from Fichte, and Feuerbach saw so clearly and
criticized so much.

Feuerbach felt that Fichte and Hegel

tried to solve merely verbally the problems that Kant
tackled with full force.

With this frame of mind Feuerbach

could see Fichte and Hegel's attempts only as self-destructive.19

Hegel's move from pure Being to the Absolute had

to fail, from Feuerbach's point of view, for Hegel accepted
the Absolute as true before he posited pure Being.
16Ibid.

17Ibid.

18 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

19Ibid., p. 10.

This

9
presupposition rendered his philosophy a circular system.
Feuerbach's foremost interest was the welfare of
mankind.

He saw speculative philosophy, with its two

major currents being Hegelian philosophy and Christianity,
as that which kept man alienated from himself.

Thus, in

chapter one I shall discuss Feuerbach's "Towards a Critique
of Hegelian Philosophy," as well as Feuerbach's criticism
of speculative philosophy in general.

I shall begin here

for Feuerbach's discussion of Hegel's philosophy is fundamental to his critique of Christian religion and theology.
Chapter two and three will be devoted to Feuerbach's
criticism of Christian religion and theology, as well as
of religion in general.

It came out of his criticism of

Hegel and of speculative philosophy.

Feuerbach saw

Hegelian philosophy as the highest form of philosophy and
Christian religion as the highest form of religion.

When

he talked about speculative philosophy and religion in
general he seemed to apply the specific criticisms he had
already made concerning Hegelianism and Christianity.

By

moving from the particular to the general in these chapters,
I hope to capture some of Feuerbach's own movement.

Later

chapters will be devoted to putting forth critiques of
Feuerbach's views concerning man, religion, and philosophy.
Feuerbach's view of man is basic to all of his
philosophical writings.

To eliminate all the illusions and

falsehoods in speculative philosophy, whether Hegelian
thought or Christian theology, would, he felt, be a great

10
service to mankind.
to man.
a

It would return the thoughts of man

Man would once again become conscious of himself as

full and complete human being.

he sought.

This ideal was the goal

CHAPTER I
CRITIQUE OF HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY
Feuerbach was, in his early intellectual career, a
disciple of Hegel.

However, as early as 1828, when he

submitted his dissertation, one could see the beginning
of a break with Hegelian thought.

Although Feuerbach

wrote his dissertation in Hegelian terms, he began to stress
in that work his thoughts about sensuousness.

He felt that

ideas should not be considered above or separated from that
which was sensuous in nature.

When these ideas were

separated from the sensuous, they were placed in the realm
of the universal and therefore sense perception would not
participate in them.

If one returned to the sensuous one

would then see ideas as a definite part of the phenomena.'
As Feuerbach understood sense perception, it could not be
left out of the knowledge gaining process.

Treating sense

perception as he did also meant that Feuerbach recognized
the phenomenon as real being.
According to Hegel the universal reached the status
2
of Being through the particulars.
1 Lowith, Hegel to Nietzsche, p. 72.
2
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy,
vol. 1: Greece and Rome; vol. 2: Mediaeval Philosophy,
11

12
Thus, the particulars were below the universal and were
considered only in the process in which the universal
reached Being.

The particulars were not independent of

the universal and thus had no reality of their own.

As

one can see, Hegel was primarily concerned with the universal while Feuerbach was primarily concerned with the
concrete.

Here one can perceive a definite break between

the two thinkers.
Key questions that Feuerbach asked about Hegelian
philosophy were reflected in his writings entitled
"Philosophical Fragments."

He expressed his doubt as to

whether or not Hegel's move from ideas to nature was
legitimate.3

The major objection that Feuerbach communi-

cated in his "Philosophical Fragments" was simply this:
"A philosophy that begins with mind, spirit, thought and
treats only these as real, or necessary, or self-evident,
can never get to Nature, to the non-mental, non-spiritual,
to that which is experienced and not experiencing."4
Basic elements of this critique can be seen in Feuerbach's
differences with Hegel over the place of sense perception
in philosophical knowledge.

Also this critique continues

Augustine to Scotus; vol. 3: Ockham to Suarez; vol. 4:
Descartes to Liebniz; vol. 5: Hobbes to Hume; vol. 6: Wolff
to Kant; vol. 7: Fichte to Nietzsche; vol. 8: Bentham to
Russell; 8 vols. (London: Burns and Oates Limited, 1965;
also in paperback edition, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Company, Inc. 1962), 7:197.
3Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 71.
4

Ibid.
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to prove important in Feuerbach's later works, particularly "Towards a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy."
Hegelian philosophy, like all idealism, came under
heavy fire from other areas of philosophy even while
Hegel was still alive.

Why did Hegel's philosophy become

isolated and abandoned so rapidly?

Germany of Hegel's time

was ready to have some of its socio-economical problems
solved.

These were problems with which idealism could not

deal, but problems that had potential materialistic solutions.

Feuerbach, for one, perceived some of these solu-

tions.

He attacked Hegelian philosophy and by positing

the negation of Hegelianism developed his own philosophy.

5

Feuerbach, in his work and studies, inverted Hegelian
philosophy by claiming that the idealist's move from the
abstract to the concrete, from the ideal to the real, was
the opposite of what was really the case.

The only path

to the true objective reality was to start with what was
6
real, i.e., sensuous nature.

Feuerbach was sure that the

truth of man would he revealed if Hegelian philosophy were
inverted.
Feuerbach recognized the problem in Hegelian philosophy but he had to demonstrate it.

He began his criticism

of Hegelianism by asking and then answering two interrelated
questions.

First, was the starting place in Hegel's Logic

5
Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 268.
6Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 161.
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the correct starting place for philosophy?

In other words,

did Hegel start with the proper thesis and antithesis?
Second, was it true, as Hegelians claimed, that Hegelian
7
If he could answer
philosophy had no presuppositions?
these questions, and show that Hegel was wrong, then he
would be in a position to produce his own philosophy out of
his Hegelian critique. His philosophy would stand to Hegel's
thought in the same relation as the antithesis stands to
the thesis.
I shall begin with the second question first. Hegel,
according to Feuerbach, had two major presuppositions at
work.

First the starting point for his philosophical

system was determined by Fichte's idealism. Hegel's

Logic

was set up in much the same way as FichtetsTheory of Science.
Hegel was interested in developing a formal system, i.e., a
system that would return to itself.

He felt that the be-

ginning had to be present in the end, and that the end had
to be present in the beginning.
cular philosophy.8

His philosophy was a cir-

Because of this movement, Hegel's

philosophy became self-determining and self-presenting
thought.

As the Absolute proceeded through history it

became aware of itself.

It gained knowledge of itself.

Hegel saw his philosophy as encompassing all of the history
of philosophy, history of art, and history of religion.

In

other words, Hegel saw his philosophy as the end point and
7Ibid., p. 59.

8Ibid., pp. 60-61.

his Absolute as the Absolute that knew itself completely.
What Hegel did not realize but Feuerbach did, however, was
that as long as the Absolute became aware of itself, the entire philosophy of the Absolute became a system that could
potentially be true only within itself.

The propositions

within it could all logically follow one another, but it was
possible that they did not explain reality as well as Hegel
thought they did.
Let one consider, for example, that there is a computer program A, and that any problem that is presented to A
from within A, can be solved by A.

Let one also consider

that there is a computer program B. If a problem is presented
in terms of B and put into A to solve, A will not be able to
solve it.
cussion.

Now let this analogy be carried over into the disAny problem that arises within a formal system,

that system can deal with and solve, but if a problem is put
into that system from outside of it, from sensuous nahiv, for
example, then the formal system cannot deal with it.
bach perceived Hegelianism as such a formal system.

FeuerWithin

itself it was coherent, but once outside its boundaries it
proved inadequate.
The second presupposition Feuerbach believed he
recognized was a direct result of Hegel's system.

This :re -

supposition was Hegel's end point, the Absolute Idea.
Hegel's proof of the Absolute, his Logic, was a formal
proof according to Feuerbach.

Hegel began his Logic with

pure Being, but even before he began he already considered

the Absolute Idea to be true.

Therefore, he was forced by

necessity to prove that the Absolute was true.

The proof was

a formal one because the Idea did not create or prove itself
through sense perceptions of the intellect, i.e., touch,
hearing, sight, etc., but it proved itself by working backwards and pretending to deduce itself from pure Being.9

In

other words, Hegel thought the Absolute, but said pureBeing.
Then he moved from pure Being, via his thesis -antithesis
dialectic, to the Absolute.

His real movement could be seen,

however, as follows: Absolute--pure Being--Absolute.

The

Absolute with the underline represents his underlying presupposition.

Due to this circular motion Hegelian philoso-

phy's purported proof of the Absolute was in reality an indefensible break with sense perception.
Feuerbach was not the only one who realized that
Hegel's method of proving the Absolute, his dialectic, had
many problems.

Geothe recognized this problem and felt un-

easy when the dialectic was being used.

He warned that the

dialectic could be used to turn falsehoods into apparent
truths.10 Since Hegel's dialectic could be used to prove
falsehoods, it was possible that Hegel had committed that
very error, thought Feuerbach, and had proved a false
Absolute.
It is now possible to return to the first question.
Was Hegel's starting place the correct starting place for
9Ibid., pp. 74-76.
10 _
Lowith, Hegel to Nietzsche, p. 11.
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philosophy?

Hegel formally began his Logic with pure Being,

which was an abstraction, and he was never able to do away
with the abstract when he reached the Absolute.

He was

never able to proceed from the abstract to the concrete and
therefore ended up with an infinite Absolute.

Philosophy

could not start, according to Feuerbach, with an infinite
or a predicate of an infinite; that is, philosophy could not
start with the Absolute or God or predicates of these.
needed to begin with finite real being.

It

If one said that

something had a quality, or if one attempted to define a
quality, one had to be able, asserted Feuerbach, to point to
something real so that one could see and understand the
quality that was being defined.11

For example, if one said

that there was a quality of 'hardness', one would have to be
able to attribute the same quality to all things that were
categorized under the title of 'hardness'.

One would have

to be able to point out to oneself just what that something
was that was common to all the objects one categorized. The
same could be said of quantity also.

If one, such as Hegel,

began philosophy with the Absolute, then all categories that
were used to describe the world were chosen arbitrarily. The
only way to escape this dilemma would be to begin philosophy
with no presuppositions, for then one would only attribute
to the world what actually did belong to the world.

However,

one would recognize one's assumptions only if he weretobegin
11
Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 160.
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philosophy with its own antithesis, for then he would become
critical of his own starting place and be able to eliminate
any presuppositions that might have been present.

If

philosophy would begin with its own antithesis, it would not
be left in the realm of subjectivity, i. e., under the ego's
control. 12 It would be able to step out of the mist of abstraction and set itself down on concrete ground.
Most modern philosophers were guilty of not criticizing their own works, according to Feuerbach.

Kant

criticized the earlier metaphysicians, but he left his own
critical philosophy alone.
phy as the truth.

Fichte accepted Kant's philoso-

Schelling, likewise, accepted Fichte's

philosophy and tried to elaborate on it.

Hegel criticized

Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, but left his own thought
alone. 13 To approximate the right beginning these men
should have started with the antithesis of their own philosophy, that which would be critical of their thought.

In

particular, the correct place to start, according to Feuerbach, was the antithesis of Hegel's philosophy.
Why did Feuerbach decide that the antithesis of
Hegel's philosophy was the correct starting place?

Why did

he not choose the antithesis of Kant's philosophy or Fichte's thought? Feuerbach accepted Hegel's idea that the truth
in philosophy depended upon the whole of the history of
philosophy.

He saw Hegel's philosophy as the highest

12Ibid., p. 138.

13Ibid., p. 72.
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form of speculative philosophy, and therefore realized that
to advance the truth he had to begin with Hegel.

If Hegel

had started with his real antithesis, he would have been on
the right path, and he would not have ended with idealism.
He would have produced Feuerbach's type of materialism. To
have a correct philosophy, beginning with his thesis, Hegel
would have had to demonstrate that his pure Being was not
an abstract being.
tion.

However, he could not lose the abstrac-

Therefore, he left himself in the realm of subjec-

tivity. 14
Even if Hegel had begun with this antithesis, however, Feuerbach would have criticized him for Hegel proposed
non-Being, not concrete being, as pure Being's antithesis.
Why did Feuerbach perceive concrete being as the real antithesis of Hegel's philosophy instead of Hegel's antithesis,
non-Being?

The only native faculties for learning which

any man had were his senses.

These senses were a priori to

all human beings and with them the human could distinguish
himself from nature.

By use of his senses, man would know

that he was not a tree or some other object in nature.

His

senses told him that a tree stood independent of himself and
that it excluded him from the space it occupied.

The senses

made man realize that the tree denied him the right to be a
tree, and thus he realized that he was separated from it.
This distinction, that the sense perceived, was necessaryfor
14 Ibid.
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man so that he could recognize himself as a man, and as
an individual man different from others.

Thus, Feuerbach

asserted, man had to first be able to recognize nature so
that he could recognize himself.15
At this point in his argument, Feuerbach took a
halfhearted detour in order to illustrate why Hegel's
pure Being was not the correct starting place for philosophy.

He suggested that philosophers, including Hegel,

tried too hard to find a beginning, whether a particular
place, thing or idea.
asked Feuerbach?

Why even bother with this search,

Why not start with reason?

To start

with reason would be to start without any presupposition
because reason could stand alone, without a beginning.

To

abstract from reason or to doubt reason had to be done by
an act of reason.

To say that reason had a presupposition,

such as the negation of reason, was once again to assert
that reason had no presuppositions.

To eliminate any con-

tradictions with his earlier statements about beginning with
real being, Feuerbach said that real being referred the
thinker directly to reason, because as one came into contact with a real being, one would attempt to look at it and
categorize it through an act of reason.16

Such a line of

argument actually defeated Feuerbach's purpose.

For if

philosophy could start with such a general idea as reason,
anywhere along the entire scale of reason, if reason were to
15
Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 72.
16 Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, pp.
59-60.
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be looked at on a scale, then Hegel's beginning could be
eventually traced to reason.

In fact, any philosophy

could eventually be traced to reason because everything
would refer itself to reason in the same way that Feuerbach's
real being had done.

The beginning Feuerbach should have

stressed was real being or nature.

It was the concrete, in

fact, that was the major emphasis in his argument.

He

stressed it because concrete being was that which was discovered by the senses.
However, Feuerbach may have had other reasons for
choosing concrete being as his antithesis.

Feuerbach may

have been guilty, as he thought Hegel was, of assuming his
conclusions to be true before he started.

Feuerbach claimed

that Hegel was guilty of basing his philosophy on a concept
that he already accepted as true, namely the Absolute Idea.
As one can see, Feuerbach began his philosophy with what he
called real, concrete being and he justified his beginning
by saying that it was discovered by what was a priori in man,
i.e., senses.

My question is this: was it possible that

Feuerbach perceived some of the materialistic solutions to
Germany's problems and based his philosophy on these solutions?

If so, then it would seem that he presupposed his

own ends before he began.

This action was just what he

accused Hegel of doing.
There is evidence from Feuerbach's own writings that
this procedure might indeed have been the case.

In a letter

he sent to Hegel, along with his dissertation, he expressed

22
some of his ideas.

He told Hegel that he felt that philoso-

phy should get away from schools and return to man. 17
Philosophy should make an attempt to reach the common man
so that the common man could learn from it to help himself.
I am sure Hegel would have agreed with this program, but
Feuerbach's implications were overwhelmingly pro-humanistic,
i.e., his goal was that mankind should become a being that
recognized that he, man, was really the object of all of his
prayers and deeds that he reserved for God.

Therefore, it

would seem that Feuerbach created a philosophy to meet
his own ends.
In Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel attacked the senses
or sense-certainty.

The question that Hegel was attempting to

answer was simply whether or not the sense perceptions were
as trustworthy as they first appeared to he.

He said that

there was a 'this', such as this house, this tree, etc., and
that the 'this' could be divided into the 'here' and 'now'
in the following manner.
is raining'.

Take a proposition such as 'now it

One knows that this statement is true if one

goes to the window, looks out and sees that it is raining.
If it stops raining at a later time, then the proposition
'now it is raining' becomes false.
the 'here'.
is a house'.

The same can be said of

'Here is a tree', hut later the 'here' is 'here
The 'here' and 'now' of sense -certainty

17Nathan Rotenstreich, "Anthropology and Sensibility, Revue Internationale de Philosophic 26 (1972); 340.
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or Adolphness" was rea1.2°
Feuerbach also refuted Hegel by approaching the
matter from a different angle. 'Here is a tree', but if the
observer then turns around the tree is no longer the 'here'
but 'here is a house'.

Does the removal of the tree from

the observer's visual field mean that the tree was not real,
that sense-certainty of the tree a few seconds earlier
was false?

If the observer backs up toward the tree, the

house still being the 'here', he will bump into the tree.
The tree asserts its own reality by excluding others from
21
the same space that it occupies.
Although Hegel believed
that he was refuting the sensuous consciousness by refuting
the 'here' and 'now' he was really only refuting the 'here'
22
and 'now' of a logical language.
The only 'thisness' that Hegel experienced or explored was the universal. He avoided the particulars by
looking at the universal within the consciousness. Thus he
saw the universal 'thisness' within the consciousness, and
not the particular tree, house, etc. However, according to
Feuerbach, there could be no real tree in the consciousness
if there were no real tree existing. 23 The real tree was
necessary for reason to refer to or grasp, so that it could
be entered into the consciousness as real.

If a thing did

not exist, or was not so that the senses could experience it,
then it could only be entered into the consciousness as imagination.

Such was Hegel's Absolute Idea.

2°Ibid., p. 77.

21Ibid., p. 78.

22Ibid.

23Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, p.75.
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Hegel claimed that his Logic followed nature or was
patterned after it, although according to Feuerbach,
Hegelian philosophy was merely an imitation of nature and
not a good one at that.

At the end of Hegel's Logic one

finds art, religion, philosophy, and the Absolute.

If one

were to consider religion, it would be seen as all that art
encompassed plus a little more, and if one were to look at
philosophy, it would be seen as all that religion encompassed, thus art, plus a little more.

If one were to con-

sider the Absolute, one would see that it encompassed all.
As soon as religion was introduced, then art no longer
existed as art per se,

but became a part of religion. The

same happened to religion as soon as philosophy was introEverything that is, in Hegel's Logic, was merely a
24
Therefore,
moment or process on the way to the Absolute.

duced.

anything that was to be considered real had to be a moment
in the life of the Absolute. Thus the Absolute was thetotality of truth.

This position, however, presented a pro-

blem to Hegel when he considered nature. He had to consider
nature as real, but in doing so he forced a dualism on himself, a dualism that made nature and the Absolute both real
and separate.

To avoid this dichotomy Hegel accepted the

rational structure found within nature as real, making it a
moment in the life of the Absolute, and called that which was
in nature but outside the rational structure unreal and
24

Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Fichte to
Nietzsche, p. 200.
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irrational.25

Therefore, Hegel's Logic allowed only for

subordination and succession but not coordination and coexistence.

Nature, however, does allow for these.

There is

the possibility of independent existence in nature whereas
everything in Hegel's system is interconnected.

Since all

is connected, it is possible that all could come to a head
in a particular individual or messiah.

Within nature,Feuer-

bach claimed, this total coherence in one man was impossible.
Could, he asked, an entire species recognize itself in one
individual of that species?

No!

Could, for example, all

art be represented by one artist, or all philosophy by one
philosopher?

According to Hegel the answer would be yes,

but according to nature it would have to be no.

As Geothe

said, "only all men taken together cognize nature, and only
u26
all men taken together live human nature.
One could reduce Feuerbach's major criticism to the
following: Hegel's dialectic did not prove or establish anything that it did not originally assume to be true, and
Hegel could only maintain his idealism by distorting sense
27
Feuerbach
perception and the concept of sense-certainty.
also believed he had detected another minor criticism of
Hegel's dialectic.

Feuerbach did not feel that the dialectic

could be adequately applied to nature. Hegel expressed his
dialectic by comparing it to a fruit tree. He said that first

2SIbid.
26Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, pp. 55-56.
27Hook, Hegel to Marx, p. 226.
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there was the bud and then the flower appeared.

When the

flower appeared the bud disappeared, i.e., the flower negated the bud.

Next came the fruit, and once again, when

the fruit appeared the flower disappeared.

28

In this manner

they were all interconnected and not independent of each
other.

If the bud never appeared, the flower would never

appear and so on.

However, let us consider the leaves.

Regardless of how the bud was or the flower or fruit, the
leaves would still exist.

The leaves and other aspects of

the tree were in this sense independent of each other.29
Hegel's dialectic did not adequately explain nature and
therefore had to be abandoned by Feuerbach.

If Hegel had

accepted the primacy of the senses, he would have copied
and explained nature much more accurately.

Because Hegel

did not accept the senses, Feuerbach could only assert that
Hegel's dialectic movement through nature and his attitude
toward nature were wrong.
Feuerbach, on reaching this point, found himself in
a strange position.

He did not accept Hegel's Absolute

Mind, but he also wanted to avoid being accused of holding
a philosophy such as the one of Hume.

He did not want to

arrive at the same conclusion as Hume, namely that one could
not know anything outside his own mind , and he had to explain
why.

He also wanted to avoid the accusation that if senses
28
Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 68.
29Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 54.
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were all that one had with which to know things, then one
would basically be no different than animals.

To avoid both

of these problems, Feuerbach added a Kantian idea to his
philosophy.

He began with the senses and then said that our

ego took part in experiencing the objects that were originally discovered with the senses. 30

Feuerbach was, unfortu-

nately, vague about this position in his philosophy.

He did

not expand it or develop it so that one could readily understand what the ego actually did.

It may be that Feuerbach

found himself in a dilemma, but did not concern himself unduly because his main objective was to improve the lot of
mankind.

A problem, such as what is the role of the ego in

the knowledge gaining process, was not as important to solve
as the social problems he thought his philosophy would alleviate.
Since Hegel placed in his philosophy that which was
primary as secondary, he ignored the senses and what was discovered through them.

He obtained this result because he did

not use the "genetico-critical" method of inquiry.
his philosophy rendered this method impossible.

In fact

The "genet-

ico-critical" method was the process of inquiry upon which
Feuerbach concentrated and developed his philosophy.

The

"genetico-critical" method went back to the source and needs
of an idea or concept, i.e., to its point of generation
("genetico"), and then considered it critically. 31

30

iIb d., pp. 140-141.

31

Ibid., p. 86.

As one

29
will see in the next chapter, this method played a very important part in Feuerbach's critique of theology.
Feuerbach cannot be accused of having a shallow understanding of Hegel.

In 1834 Feuerbach answered Bachmann's

Antihegel in terms that would cause one to believe that Hegel
32
himself had written it.
Feuerbach did understand Hegel
and realized what Hegel was doing.

It may seem strange and

rather inconsistent, therefore, that Feuerbach later used the
same basic arguments against Hegel that he had originally
attacked in Bachmann's work.

This inconsistency was explained

by Feuerbach as a maturation of his thought.

Although his

abandonment of Hegel's philosophy was a process ofnutumfion
for Feuerbach, one must wonder if his high social goals did
not lead him into self-deception.

His attack on Hegel might

have been effective in undermining his former mentor, but it
led him into many problems that he did not adequately try to
resolve, chief of which was the ego's place in the knowledge
gaining process.
From a discussion of Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel's
speculative philosophy, we now turn to an analysis of his
broader critique of all speculative philosophy.

This dis-

cussion is of necessity brief, however, because of Feuerbach's own use of language.

Feuerbach did not hesitate, in

many of his writings, to interchangeably use the terms
theology, speculative philosophy, and speculative theology.
32 Lowith, Hegel to Nietzsche, p. 73.

30
He felt that theology was the secret of speculative philosophy and that speculative philosophy was the secret of
speculative theology.

33

Since speculative philosophy was

used instead of theology and visa versa, much of what Feuerbach had to say about speculative philosophy is reserved for
the next chapter.

In this section on speculative philosophy

there is an effort to show Feuerbach's transition from the
criticism of Hegelianism to the criticism of Christian
theology and religion.
If one were to disregard sense perception, one could
choose three possible paths of explanation.

First, one

could possibly rationalize the universe and thus give the
forces of nature a mode of reason; second, one might posit
a dualism where public and objective truths of reason are
held in the absence of understanding by the senses; and third,
one might pass the sensuous world off as an illusion and talk
34
When Feuerbach attacked
of reason in terms of spirit.
Hegel, he knowingly attacked all European philosophy from
35
In other words, in attacking Hegel
Spinoza to Descartes.
he attacked all speculative philosophy.

The underlying im-

plication of his critique of Hegel was that, for Feuerbach,
all of the speculative philosophies were merely different
forms of rationalized theology, because the secret of
speculative philosophy was theology and visa versa.
33Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 153.
34Hook, Hegel to Marx, p. 232.

35Ibid.

Hegel's
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philosophy provided a clue for Feuerbach to the truth of all
speculative philosophy and theology, thus Christianity.
To be more specific, Feuerbach felt that Hegel's
philosophy was a rationalized form of Christianity.

The

Idea was a rational expression for the theological doctrine
that nature and material being were all created by God.
In the preface to The Essence of Christianity,
Feuerbach expressed briefly how his ideas stood in relation
to those of the speculative philosophers.

He said that his

thought repudiated absolute, immaterial speculation,
speculation that drew its objects and its materials from
within itself.

Since he required senses for thought, he

subsequently generated the thought from the object and not
the object from the thought as the speculative philosophers
36
did.
As Feuerbach said himself of his philosophy in the
preface mentioned above:
It does not, as I have already said elsewhere, regard
the pen as the only fit organ for the revelation of
truth, but the eye and ear, the hand and foot; it does
not identify the idea of the fact with the fact itself,
so as to reduce real existence to an existence on
paper, but it separates the two, and precisely bx
this separation attains to the fact itself;....3
Feuerbach, therefore, accused the speculative philosophers
of ignoring the senses and of mixing up the idea of the
thing, with the thing itself.

The speculative philosophers

36Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity,
trans. by George Eliot and with Introductory Essay by Karl
Barth and a Forward by H. Richard Niebuhr (New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1937), p. xxxiv.
37Ibid., p.
xxxv.
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might have retorted that the fact as a thing did not exist
but was generated from the Idea.

As shown in the preceding

section, Feuerbach would have countered that accusation by
saying that the thing was real because, by denying others
the right to occupy the same space it occupied, it asserted
its own reality.
Feuerbach would say of speculative philosophies,
and especially of Hegelianism, that because they were
abstract philosophies they placed the "essence of nature
outside of nature, the essence of man outside of man and
the essence of thought outside thought."38

In other words,

they alienated man from himself.
Hegel had sought to bring man together through the
mediating figure of "God-man."

"God-man" represented the

coming together of the spiritual and material elements of
man.

This reunion was necessary before all of man, as an

individual, could be reunited with his essence in the form
of spirit.

Feuerbach rejected the "God-man" idea and felt

that only if the speculative philosophies were negated would
man be directly brought back together with his essence.39
Feuerbach attempted this reversal in his philosophy by
starting with what he called the negation of Hegelian
philosophy, the real Hegelian antithesis, concrete realbeing.
All one needed to do, said Feuerbach, was to take the predicate of speculative philosophy and make it the subject, and
38Feuerbach,

Fiery Brook, pp. 156-57.

39Ibid., p. 157.
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make the subject the object.

The result could be achieved

by reversing speculative philosophy, i.e., using its negation as the beginning of philosophy, and this process would
40
bring one to the real truth.
Feuerbach's work with speculative philosophies consisted of his attempts to retool them into a philosophy of
man.

He did not concern himself with setting up directly

a positive system, but rather attempted to 'extract' man
,41
from his "idealistic veil.

Therefore, he attempted to

derive from speculative philosophy (theology) the philosophy of man (anthropology).
The speculative philosophers, when attempting to derive
the finite from the infinite, found themselves in the center
of a contradiction, Feuerbach claimed.

Since the finite

and determinable came from the infinite and undeterminable,
the infinite and undeterminable were really determined by the
finite and determinable.

The infinite and undeterminable

would be worthless without the finite and determinable.
Since the finite was determined by the infinite it in turn
negated the infinite and determined it.
This relationship between the finite and infinite,
Feuerbach said, was the same relationship one could find
between God and man.
infinite.

Man as the finite negated God the

God was a pointless idea without man's being

"Ibid., p. 154.
41

Lowith. Hegel to Nietzsche, p. 310.
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around to give him value.42
One can see that Feuerbach felt that he had returned the essence of man to man in philosophy.

However,

since Hegelianism was merely rational Christianity, Feuerbach felt that his next step would have to be to return
man's essence to man in the Christian theology of the everyday population.

Negating Hegel's philosophy had no effect

on the common man.

Thus his next attempt, he felt, must

aim at giving truth to man.

In this way the wider popula-

tion could see that its prayers to God were wasted energy,
energy that could be best spent on the betterment of the
human condition.
42Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 159.

CHAPTER II
CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIANITY
In the last chapter, I took a close look at Feuerbach's critique of Hegelianism, and tried to demonstrate
how Feuerbach's critique of Christianity followed naturally
from it.

Feuerbach realized that the speculative philoso-

phies, including that of Hegel, were in reality particular
types of worship.

Speculative philosophers treated the

philosophy of history as a type of religious history.

They

treated the state as divine heaven brought to earth, and
they represented God as absolute logic, i.e., as pure
Feuerbach attacked all forms of a "conceptual"

thought.1

knowledge of God.

To have a "conceptual" knowledge of God

was to have knowledge of the human elements in God.2

Some

theologians that Feuerbach attacked, because of their views
of how man knew God, were Schleiermacher, Wegscheide, De
Witte, and the ilegelians.

All of these theologians had a "con-

ceptual" knowledge of God, and Karl Barth felt Feuerbachts
act of stripping them of their superhuman elements was an
act of intellectual honesty.

To view God conceptually

1Lowith, Hegel to Nietzsche, p. 47.
7

-Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and
Religion (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), pp. 178179.
35
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meant that man could reach or reveal God throuplahis own
efforts.

If God were to be approached through human cffcrt,

according to Barth, Feuerbach was correct in his theological conc1usions.3
Feuerbach was not the only philosopher of that
period who recognized that Hegelian philosophy, if followed
to its logical end, would take one to an anthropological
theology.

In 1835 David Strauss published his Life of Jesus

and in that book he reduced the figure of Jesus and the
entire Gospel to the status of a mythical work.

However, he

said that one could discover some truths about mankind in
the myths.

A short time later Bruno Bauer approached the

figure of Jesus even more critically than Strauss.

Not only

did Bauer deny the reality of Christ as a historical figure,
but he also asserted that no truth could be found in the
Gospel at all.

What both of these men had in common with

Feuerbach was a belief that Hegelian philosophy made it
evident that Christianity had to be evaluated.4
Feuerbach, however, perceived a difference between
his objectives and the objectives of Bauer and Strauss.
He said that while Bauer and Strauss were interested in
evaluating and criticizing dogmatic Christianity or institutionalized Christianity, he was interested in looking
3
Barth, Theology and Church, trans.Louiselettibone
Smith (New York: Harper
Row Publishers, 1962), p. 213.
4Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach,
p. 14.
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at Christianity in general, i.e., the Christian religion.5
The difference between the thoughts of these men was as
follows.

Strauss and Bauer criticized an actual institution

because they felt that the institution was wrong.

Feuerbach

attacked a religion and its accompanying theology because he
felt that it contained a contradiction. It placed the essence
of man outside of man much like Hegelian philosophy placed
the thought of man outside of man.

In Hegelian philosophy

the thought of man was eventually returned to man.

This

return was completed indirectly by asserting that the
6
totality of God's thought was the totality of man's thought.
Likewise, Christianity eventually returned the essence of
man to man, but it was unaware of the fact that it was doing
so.

It accomplished this act by attributing human predicates

to God.

When one used religious language to talk about God

one was really using religious language to talk about man.
Religion wrapped man up in its own mystical language.

Feuer-

bach explained this movement in the following way: "...it is
not I, an insignificant individual, but religion itself that
says: God is man, man is God..."

Religion confused the

subject and the object, but at the same time it hid this very
fact.

It deceived itself into believing something else, that

is, the opposite of what it really meant.

Feuerbach felt that

Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p. xiii.
6
See p. 32.
7
Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p. xxxvi.
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upon close analysis one would see that this deception was
taking place in religion.

Once one discovered the illusion

of religion, the contradiction between the content and
meaning in religion would be eliminated and man would know
where he really stood in relation to God.

In other words,

once man realized that the meaning placed on God as the
content of religion was meant for man, then man would no
longer allow God to be the content.

As it was, according

to Feuerbach, the meaning which was man's was in God and
thus contradicted itself.
Feuerbach's major work, The Essence of Christianity,
published in 1842, was an attempt to point out these contradictions and eliminate them.

The book dealt with the

Christian religion and therefore went beyond anything that
Strauss or Bauer accomplished.

Feuerbach felt that

religion and theology were a necessary part of man's existence whereas Strauss and Bauer did not believe that such
was the case.

Feuerbach felt that one had to look at the

reasons why some phenomena were held to be divine, or were
divinized beings, before he could understand religion's
real essence.

Feuerbach could not simply pass off religion

as a total misconception.

He did not want to deny the

reality of religious feeling, but he asked whythesefteliings
had to be divine.

He thought that they could be attributed

to the elements of the natural world.8
8Kai Nielsen, "Is God So Powerful That He Doesn't Even
Have to Exist?" in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Sidney
Hook (New York: New Yorlc University Press, 1961), pp. 274-275.
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Feuerbach's critique of religion can be divided into
two parts, first a specific critique of Christianity and
second, a more general critique of religion.

This chapter

will deal with Feuerbach's specific critique of Christianity,
and the next chapter will deal with his critique of religion
in general.

Feuerbach's criticism of Christian religion

can also be divided into two parts.

The first part of his

thesis, what Feuerbach called positive, was a demonstration
that the predicates that were used to describe God were
really only human predicates, i.e., predicates used to describe human things.

In the first part he showed that the

true essence of Christianity was anthropology, and in the
second part he attempted to show that distinctions made
between the human and divine predicates were absurd.9

Thus,

the work was an attempt to reduce theology to anthropology
and raise anthropology to theology.

Feuerbach called the

first part positive because he tried to illuminate the truth
of religion.

This truth constituted the fact that man ex-

pressed his intimate wishes and desires to himself.

The

negative part of his critique was an attempt to display the
absurdity of addressing and attributing these wishes and
desires to a superhuman and supernatural being.

Since reli-

gion really worshipped man, Feuerbach felt, it would be better
9
Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p. xxxvii.
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if it were done directly and not indirectly through God."
The main source that will be used in this chapter
will be Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity, but I shall
also use Lectures on the Essence of Religion, and other
articles and essays that Feuerbach wrote.

I stated briefly

at the end of chapter one, why Feuerbach felt that the study
of religion was so important and why he felt it was neces—
sary to criticize it in the manner that he did.

Before I

begin his actual criticism, I would like to expand on some
of the reasons that were behind his actual criticism.
Feuerbach began his Principles of the Philosophy of
the Future with a short statement that expressed his general
thesis.

"The task of the modern era was the realization

and humanization of God--the transformation and dissolution
of theology into anthropology."11
placed on the modern era?

Why was this task to be

What was to be gained by it?

As

Feuerbach understood historical epochs, their change was reflected and caused by religious change.

12

The nineteenth

century was a century of change. The effects of the Enlighten ment were colliding with Romanticism, urban population was expanding, industrywas on the rise. Everything that had been
stable in the eighteenth century was now changing.

The

social aspects of man's existence came under great strain.
10Feuerbach, The Essence of Faith According to
Luther, trans. and Introduction by Melvin Cherno (New York:
Row Publishers, 1967), pp. 12-13.
Harper
11Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 167.

12Ibid., p. 146.
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Religion was also changing but the change was on the whole
unconscious.

Feuerbach felt that if religion recognized its

change, then much of the social strain would be alleviated.
There existed in the nineteenth century, according to Feuerbach, a theoretical belief in God, but there was at the same
time a practical denial of God taking place in the social
order of the century.13

In other words, the religious people

would say they believed in God and in their worship even act
as if they did, but in everyday life, in their everyday
dealing with other humans, there was a practical denial of
God's existence.

Feuerbach felt that if man would recognize

the true object of his worship, then this practical denial
would not take place.

Within society man would not be able

to deny himself if he realized that it was his essence that
he worshipped in God.
One could also see, according to Feuerbach, evidence
for this denial of God in the Protestant religion.
reflected by the role of the Virgin in religion.

It was

Protestants

believed in the Virgin birth but they did not give the Virgin
the same status that was placed on her in the Catholic Church.
Why, asked Feuerbach?
married.

Protestant church leaders could get

Protestants had turned away from the heavenly

Virgin bride to the earthly woman.

Since the Catholics still

held celibacy as good, they devoted themselves to the Holy
13Ibid., pp. 146-147.
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Virgin and not to the earthly female.14

Thus the Protes-

tants had, in practice and unconsciously, reaffirmed the
real essence of womanhood by denying the Virgin as a divine
object.
According to Feuerbach the Protestants were closer
to realizing the true object of religion than the Catholics.
This idea was reflected not only by the fact that the Protestants did turn away from the Holy Virgin, but also because the object of Protestant religion was a God much
different than the Catholic's God.
very much theocentric.

The Catholics were still

Their God was a God that could only

be reached through man's self-denial, i.e., the denial of
all material things to monks, and nuns.
God was much more anthropocentric.

The Protestant's

He existed for man and

for man's welfare)5
Not only did Feuerbach perceive the difficulty that
individuals would have with the contradiction within religion, but he also sensed some of the effects that misdirected religion would have on society.

Because man got

the object of religion confused in Christianity, Christianity would not help keep the state together.

Men theo-

retically felt they were dependent upon God and not upon
each other.

If they had felt they were dependent on each

other, there would have been little use for God.

However,

14 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, pp. 72-73.
15Jacob Taubes, "The Copernican Turn of Theology,"
in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Sidney Hook (New
York: New YorI University Press, 1961), p. 71.
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in practice men really were dependent on other men.

If

this situation had not existed, men would never have begun
any form of social institutions.

In theory, religion sepa-

rated the people from the state.

The dependency on God was

enough to interfere with the smooth operations of the
state.

16

Instead of being loyal to man or to the state,

man would be, superficially and practically, loyal to God. 17
One can see that Feuerbach's passionate attacks
against Christianity were caused by his love for what
he felt was the truth.

Karl Barth, in his introductory

essay to The Essence of Christianity, said of Feuerbach that
"he felt compelled by a kind of prophetic enthusiasm to say
•
it ,,l8 i.e.,
what the real essence of Christianity was.
Most assuredly Barth was correct.

Feuerbach attacked his

subject with passion, like a man with something so important
to say that he had to express it in every possible way.
One will find in The Essence of Christianity that Feuerbach
repeated himself a number of times.
from many different directions.

He approached ideas

Feuerbach felt that it was

for the good of man that man realized his real essence. Although Feuerbach's attempts may seem misdirected to some
theologians and philosophers, to Feuerbach, and to one who
reads him with a sympathetic eye, his charges and criticisms
16

Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 149.

17 Ibid., p. 152.

18Barth, Introduction to The Essence of Christianity, by Ludwig Feuerbach (New YorkT Harper & Row Publishers,
1957), p. x.
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are sincere and somewhat valuable.
I shall reserve criticism of his ideas until a later
chapter because the flow of his argument would be lost if
one were to insert criticism into the work.

After this

brief statement of the reasons for his work, I shall now
begin with his actual criticism of Christianity.
Ludwig Feuerbach began The Essence of Christianity
with an introduction that is divided into two parts: "The
Essential Nature of Man," and "The Essence of Religion Considered Generally."

Both of these discussions by Feuerbach

were general statements of what would be found later in more
detail in the major part of the work.

However, several

interesting things from these sections must be discussed
before I can proceed.
The first thing one must look at is the difference
between man and animals because Feuerbach felt that it was
just this difference that led to the rise of religion inman.19
The essential difference between man and animals, said Feuerbach was consciousness, butconsciousnessof a certain type.
Feuerbach asked, for example, did a brute have consciousness,
and if so what kind?

After reflecting upon it he said yes a

brute did have consciousness, but a limitedone. "Hence the
brute has only a simple,man a twofold life:

in the brute,

the inner life is one with the outer; man has both inner and
outer life."20

What Feuerbach meant was simply that the brute

19Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p. 1.
20Ibid., p. 2.
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had only consciousness of itself.

The brute could not do

anything with regard to its species without another of its
species present.

Because the brute had only a simple life

it did not have consciousness of its species. Man, on the
other hand, was aware of his species. He showed this awareness by functioning, when alone, as if in a relation to his
species. Man could talk to himself and recognize himself as
both subject and object. He could put himself in an "I and
thou" relationship with himself. 21 Because man was aware of
his species, his species could become an object of worship,
thus eventually religious.
The second thing I want to point out is Feuerbach's
notion of how objects affected man and how man affected
objects.

He asked, for example, what was the feeling that

one had when a melody was experienced. That feeling was the
power of the melody, therefore the power of melody was merely
the power of feeling.
fied human feeling.

Music was, in other words, objectiIf music were nothing but objectified

human feeling, then it followed, for Feuerbach, that all
objects were, in how man experienced them, merely man's own
projected nature.

Furthermore, man needed an object so that
23
he could define his own character.
To illustrate this

point Feuerbach used the planets and the sun. Let us consider
the planets as members of the same species and the sun as
their mutual object.
21 Ibid.,

Is the sun the same object for all of

22Ibid., p. 4.

23Ibid.
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them?

No, the sun that the Earth experiences is not the

same sun that Mars experiences,norVenus; i.e., it is not
the same for any of the planets.

What is the difference in

the object, the sun, that they experience? The difference
lies in the relationship of each planet to the sun. The sun
that each planet experienced depended upon the nature of
the planet itself.

"Therefore, each planet has in its sun

the mirror of its own nature."24
Feuerbach was not denying the existence of the
object; he was saying that one's feelings about it, one's
thoughts about it, one's anything that had to do with the
object depended upon one's relationship to that object.
This idea, as we shall see, played a big part in Feuerbach's
study of religion.
The third and last point I want to make comes from the
second part of his introduction, "The Essence of Religion
Considered Generally." Feuerbach claimed that as one looked
at ancient religions one would see that the identity of the
subject and the predicate was the same.

What he meant was

that the predicates used by the ancients to describe their
gods were predicates that represented the ancients' environment.

For example, a savage in the state of nature had a

"nature-god," whereas a civilized community , a community that
lived in houses, had a god that was worshipped in a house like structure, i.e., thetemple.25 (This method of study
24

iIb d., p. 5.

25Ibid., p. 20.
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of ancient religions is an example of the "genetic-critical"
method of analysis that Feuerbach used.)

Feuerbach felt

that this relationship between man and God represented the
idea that God and man were one.
vanced with him.

As man advanced, God ad-

A savage man had a savage God and a civi-

lized man had a civilized God.
Feuerbach felt that the nineteenth century theologians could choose to believe one of two things in hopes of
avoiding criticism against "conceptualized" knowledge of
God.

However, both of them really did not answer the objec-

tion as far as Feuerbach was concerned.

First, one could

assert that God was unknowable, undefinable; but Feuerbach
claimed that an unknowable God was no God whatsoever.

To

assign no predicates to a thing was to assert that the
thing did not exist.

Thus Feuerbach could not accept the

skeptics' position about the impossibility of knowledge of
God.

If predicates were attached to God, as Feuerbach be-

lieved they had to be, they would be human predicates.26
The second thing one could say was that the predicates
attached to God had no objective validity.

But, asked

Feuerbach, what could God be, other than what he was forme?
God would have only predicates that were considered divine.
Predicates could only be considered divine if they were
first divinized in man, thus man could be no less divine
26

Ibid., p. 14.
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than God.27

The predicates that man attached to God had

to possess objective validity for man or he would not bother
to attach them to God, and man had to attach some sort of
predicate to God if he wanted to assert that God even existed.
With this brief discussion of his introduction, we
are now ready to look at the major section of The Essence
of Christianity.
zed at first.

Part one of the book looks quite unorgani-

It consists of twenty-seven short chapters,

each dealing with a different theme in Christianity. How ever, when looked at closely each chapter follows naturally
from the previous one.

In this way Feuerbach systematically

worked his way through the essence of Christianity.

I am

not going to deal with each specific chapter because many of
them are restatements of the previous chapter.

If one looks

at selected chapters, one can understand Feuerbach's movement as he analyzes and discusses Christianity.
One must begin the study with Feuerbach's ideas
about the role of sacrifice, miracle, and prayer in religion
because his views about these lay at the center of his
thought.28

Along with those three categories I shall also

discuss faith, The Virgin birth, the omnipotence of God, and
the resurrection. These are discussed with the above because they reflect man's use of his imagination. Imagination
was important to Feuerbach because it reduced suffering, and
helped man gain what he wanted.

Feuerbach said in The Es-

sence of Christianity that the ultimate essence of religion
27Ibld.,
-

p.16.

28
Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach

p. 39.
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could be seen in the simplest religious act, prayer. 29
He was not referring to the ritual prayers of people before dinner and before they go to bed, but he was referring
to prayers that are full of sorrow and wanting.
prayers are full of man's desires.
so important?
as useful?

These

Why are these prayers

Why, in Feuerbach's system, are they accepted

One will see much of Feuerbach's thought in the

answer to those two questions.
In prayer man made his heart objectified.

30

His

heart became free and he could confess himself to another;
to an imagined other, but still in a sense another.
prayer man's heart spoke to him.

In

Because his feelings got

out in the open, because he had spoken them, he no longer
carried the burden alone.

He became relieved and satisfied.

By praying man had God to share the burden with.

However,

for Feuerbach, this God was not separated from man.

Man did

not share his feelings with God, as a different being, but
he split himself into two beings.

Man became the 'I and the

He trusted his feelings of the heart, and he trusted
31
He was trusting the goodness
God to be a forgiving Being.

thou'.

of his own heart to be able to forgive.
prayer lay within the prayer itself.

Then the power of

The actual speaking of

the prayer affirmed to man that he was essentially good
because he could ask God's forgiveness for his wrong.

"The

29Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity. p. 122.
30Ibid., p. 123.

31Ibid., p. 124.

so
omnipotence to which man turns in prayer is nothing but the
omnipotence of Goodness....u 32
feeling.

Omnipotence is the power of

Man turns to his own feeling of goodness in prayer

and he comes out feeling satisfied.
The power of faith, for Feuerbach, was intertwined
with the power of prayer.

"Faith alone prays; the prayer of

faith is alone effectual."33

Faith, because it represents

the power of the subjective over nature was one with miracle.
Miracle, however, was external and faith was internal.
must have faith to have a miracle.

One

A miracle reflected the

immediate granting of a wish, and man's view of his subjective unlimitedness.
The act of sacrifice was not overly stressed by Feuerbach in The Essence of Christianity. He dealt with it in
respect to religion in general.

However, in Christianity,

sacrifice reflected man's imagined closeness to Cod.34

Man

felt at odds with God, i. e., man's own nature, and thus
gave gifts to God to bring man and God together again.

This

feeling of division and the attempt to eliminate it, once
again, reflected the false separation of man from God.
Before I proceed, there are several things that must
be discussed in some detail.
can have effective prayer.
32Ibid., p. 125.

One must have faith before one
Before one can understand this

33Ibid., p.
126.

34 Feuerbach, Lectures
on the Essence of Religion,
trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,
1967), p. 67.
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idea one must understand Feuerbach's definition of faith as
man's affirmation of his subjective power over nature.
Christianity developed from Judaism and that, according to
Feuerbach, was an egotistical religion.--

It was egotistical

because Yahweh was concerned with only one group of people,
the Jews.

He would punish them when they were being dis-

obedient, but in the end he always forgave them.

He was

their God and he was concerned with their welfare.

As

Christianity developed, Yahweh was no longer a nationalistic
God in the sense that as long as one accepted Christ he was
then his God also.

There was no longer any nation like the
God was no

Jewish nation, but the egoism was retained.

longer the God of one group, but he became one God for all
mankind.

No one group could have a collective feeling of

God's love, so the egoism became individual.
tion ceased to be important.

National salva-

Personal salvation became

important and took national salvation's place in religion.
For example, instead of a concern for the continued existence
of a religious community, man became concerned with the
continuation of his own existence.

Man wished to become

immortal; therefore he became immortal.36

This wish for

immortality exemplified the essence of faith, man's wish to
be what he was not and to do what he could not do.
process one can see the evolution of miracles.

From this

Feuerbach

thought miracles reflected and realized two things: first,
35Feuerhach, The Essence of Christianity, p. 112.
36Ibid., p. 128.
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human wishes were realized immediately and second, because
man was an egotist, they reflected his desires for superiority over nature. 37

Where else, but in a miracle, could

the laws of nature be ignored?
However, what was really the power of miracle?
What really had power over the laws of nature?
was the unlimited power in man.

Imagination

Nothing could stop or pre-

vent it from going on indefinitely, so, according to Feuerbach, a miracle was merely an aspect of imagination.38
From this point Feuerbach moved toward the principle
of resurrection.

Man did not wish to die, but he had to

demonstrate to himself in some way that he would not die.
Reason could not convince man that he was immortal, but the
imagination could.

Through the resurrection of Christ, man

showed himself that he was indeed immortal. 39

Why was it

significant that Christ was resurrected and not an ordinary
man?

If the resurrection would have been of an ordinary man,

it would not have represented the immortality of all men.
This representation was the purpose of the resurrection.
How could an ordinary man represent universal immortality?
He could represent universal immortality by making the one
who was crucified special.

Christ was born to a virgin, and

thus he was separated from man, but the virgin was a human
woman so Christ had a mother like all of us.

What was differ-

ent for Christ was the nature of his Father.

Christ was the

37

Ibid.. p. 139.

38

.
Ibid., p. 131

39

Ibid., p.133.
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Son of God, but God was merely objectified human nature so
Christ was really the 'Son of Man'.

Christ's Father was

human nature therefore Christ's resurrection could come to
symbolize the resurrection of the father.
One can see that if one begins with prayer he can
advance to the resurrection.

The fulfillment of prayer is

the fulfillment of the heart by the imagination.

The

resurrection is the ultimate achievement of the imagination.
With this discussion presented one can return to the beginning of The Essence of Christianity and begin a somewhat
systematic analysis of it.

Through this process one must

keep in mind at all times the role that is placed on imagination by Feuerbach.

If that is lost, then Feuerbach's ideas

themselves may become lost.
As stated before, man was different from the brute
because he was conscious of his species.

In his Principles

of the Philosophy of the Future, Feuerbach said that divine
knowledge had its ground in the knowledge of the species.40
That which was central to man's thought was his own species.
Man, with a limited consciousness, had in his species the
unlimitedness of the human consciousness.41 What one man
did not know another man would, or could know, and what two
men did not know another man would and so on.

Therefore man

could perceive the totality of the human species as unlimited.
40
Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 189.
41 Feuerbach,

The Essence of Christianiti, p. 2.
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As man thought about his species he would also recognize
three things, according to Feuerbach, that were present
in all of mankind.

These three things made up the humanity

of man, or the essence of man.
Affection.42

They were Reason, Will, and

Each man was, according to Feuerbach, a think-

ing being, a wishing, wanting being, and a loving being.
Since all three of these things could be found in all men to
some degree, they were considered, by mankind, to be divine.
However, these could not be perfected in the individual,
unless in the imagined Christ, and thus it was only through
the totality of man's nature that these three things could
become perfected.

This method of completing them caused

Feuerbach to make man's essence as abstract as he accused
Hegel of making man's thought.

The essence of man was

removed from the individual and applied to the whole, just
as in Hegelian philosophy what made up the essence of Mind
was not the individual mind but the totality of human mind.
Feuerbach attempted to solve this problem in later works
but he was not successful.

This criticism will be expanded

upon in a later chapter.
It was not unusual that Feuerbach had perceived three
major predicates in man.

He was a disciple of Hegel and

thus very well trained in looking at things in a triadic form.
However, one must remember that in Christianity, there is the
doctrine of the Trinity.
42
Ibid., p. 3.

Feuerbach treated Reason, Will, and
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Affection as the three elements of the Trinity.

Briefly,

God the Father was reason, God the Son was love, and the
Holy Ghost was the will or moral law, i.e., the evidence
of love between God the Father and God the Son.
By looking at the titles of chapters two and three
and four one will see the essence of God as Feuerbach perceived him.

They are, in numerical order, "God as a being

of the Understanding" (Reason), "God as a Moral Being or
Law" (Will), and "The Mystery of Incarnation; or God as
Love, as a Being of the Heart" (Affection).

The three

elements that are attributed to the human species are also
attributed to God as his major predicates.43
By the time the second edition of The Essence of
Christianity had been published Feuerbach had shaken off
most of his Hegelian ideas, but one can see the Hegelian
dialectic at work in Feuerbach's moves from a God of understanding to a God of moral law, and then to a God of love.
As I discuss each of these topics I hope to be able to
point out the underlying dialectic movement.
Man and God were, in religion, beings of the opposite
extreme, i.e., religion was the separaticn of man from himself.

Feuerbach said: "God is not what man is--man is not

43
It is appropriate to remind the reader that Feuerbach did not make the distinction between verstand and vernunft that Hegel made. Hegel defined verstand as understanding and vernunft as reason, implying that reason was a
superior method to understanding for the gaining of knowledge. Feuerbach did not make use of this distinction and
thus used the terms interchangeably.
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what God is.

God is the infinite, man the finite being,

God is perfect, man is imperfect; God eternal, man temporal:
God almighty, man weak: God holy, man sinful.”44
God was just man's own nature objectified.

However,

The truth of

this projection, said Feuerbach, was implied in the division
of man from God.

If man and God were not ofiginally one

there would be no division.

Division occurred only where

something was divided and could be divided.

Further evi-

dence of this forced separation was included with the idea
that, if man and God were not one, God's perfection would
not concern man or bother him.

Man would not care if God

was perfect, imperfect or anything e1se.45

The division

between God and man was the division of something in man.
This something, said Feuerbach, was intelligence.

"The

pure, perfect divine nature is the self-consciousness of the
understanding, the consciousness which the understanding has
46
of its own perfection."

In man intelligence became di-

vided because it realized perfect intelligence at the same
time it realized that the human being was an emotional being
and not purely intelligence, or mind.
ing was pure, perfect understanding.
sider anything superior to itself.

The God of understandReason could not con-

Whatever one thought of

God, one had to first be able to think of reason; whatever
was predicated to God had to be first predicated to reason.
Thus God was below reason, God was dependent upon reason.47
44Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p. 33.
45Ibid.

46Ibid., p. 34.

47Ibid., p. 39.

57
A man's view of God was only as comprehensible as his ability
to think, and therefore Feuerbach concluded that man's view
of God was really only a view of his own thought.

If know-

ledge of God as a real being was dependent upon man's knowledge of his own ability to think, one could see how Feuerbach would state that man's knowledge of God was really only
man's knowledge of himself.
Feuerbach introduced many arguments to support this
position but the details of them are essentially unimportant
to this paper.

What concerns us now is man's relationship

to this God of reason.

The God of understanding was not the

same God as the God worshipped in the Christian religion.
According to Feuerbach, the God of understanding was interested in more than just man.

Understanding was willing to

contemplate nature, understanding was willing to contemplate
the universe.

A God willing to consider more than man was

essentially different than man and man did not want or need
this type of God.48 Feuerbach would assert that man found
little comfort in a God that considered all aspects of the
universe as favorable as he considered man.

Inanimate

objects such as rocks, trees, etc., were all equal to reason.
For the religious man to be contemplated on an equal level
with the brutes would not be satisfactory.

God had to be

more, he had to be specifically for man.
Man's conflict with a God of reason gave rise to the
48
Ibid., p. 46.
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concept of moral perfection.

This moral perfection was

attributed to God by reason but it also negated the God of
reason.

This negation was a dialectic process that Feuer-

bach carried over into his system.

Feuerbach saw God as a

moral being generating from a God of understanding.
moral God was much more likeable to the Christian.
had nothing to do with nature per se.
which only man was involved.

This
Morality

It was something with

Thus, the moral God treated

man as its object and not nature.

Anthropologically this

treatment happened because moral perfection did not depend
on nature but depended upon will. 49
However, man was now presented with a new problem.
Since the moral ideas were generated from understanding, the
problem was now presented of how man could reconcile himself
to a moral God because of his sins.

Man was either morally

right in a choice or morally wrong, there was no middle of
the road, no excuses.

Thus man still did not have a God

with whom he could feel comfortable.

The key to being re50
conciled for one's sins was forgiveness.
Forgiveness was
a part of love.
the heart.

God became a Being of love or a Being of

Love was the center point of the Christian

religion, and Christ exemplified this love.
The blood of Christ cleanses us from our sins in the
eyes of God; it is only hishuman blood that makes God
merciful, allays his anger; that is our sins are forgiven us because we are not abstract beings, but
creatures of flesh and blood.51
49Ibid.,

p. 47.

51 Ibid.,

p. 49.

The crucifixion

was a sign of God's love for man.

"God so loved man that he gave his only begotten Son."

This

love of God for man was, according to Feuerbach, a "most
irrefragable proof that man in religion contemplates himself
as the object of the Divine Being...."52

It was God's love

for man that made man realize his own essence of love.
God's love for man was man's love for man.

Thus

When man realized

this love, instead of realizing it in himself, he attributed
it to God.
Several interesting things have come to light concerning the implicit dialectic movement in Feuerbach's work.
The thesis of understanding generated the antithesis of moral
law.

As a dialectic, the thesis and antithesis did not stand

in direct black and white contradiction but moved or flowed
back and forth into each other.
ized God as love.

In this movement man real-

Therefore the God of Christianity could

be seen, following Feuerbach's view, as a synthesis of these
three ideas: God as understanding, God as moral Being, and
God as love.

These three elements, understanding, will, and

love, were the three aspects Feuerbach recognized in man as
he thought of his species.

As he thought of them in individ-

uals he was presented with the problem of limitation, but as
he thought of them in the species the limitations were
dropped.

God was divinized human species, and religion was

unconscious worship of the human species.
52
Ibid., p. 57.
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These three human predicates, when divinized, could
be used to compose the Trinity, and this was what Feuerbach
did.

The first sentence of the chapter, "The mystery of the

Trinity and the Mother of God," reflects this idea.

Feuer-

bach said: "If a God without feeling, without capability of
suffering, will not suffice to man as a feeling, suffering
being, neither will a God with feeling only, a God without
intelligence and Will."53

For God to be completely satisfy

ing to man he had to contain all that man contained, thus
understanding, will, and love.

Feuerbach perceived the

Trinity as man's total knowledge of himself, and God, as the
Trinity, was a projection of man's knowledge of himself.
Therefore, the Trinity was man's consciousness of his total
self.

That which was human made up that which was divine.
The essence of the Trinity could also be seen in the

relationship between the Father and Son, and the father and
son.

Feuerbach asserted that the relationship between the

Father and Son in the Christian religion was the same as the
relationship between the father on earth and the son onearth.
In the doctrine of the Trinity Feuerbach saw the Father as
understanding and the Son as love.

One must see how the Son

arose from the Father to understand how Feuerbach saw thema
literal father and son.

The Christian religion was essental-

ly a private religion and a religion that demanded that man
withdraw from the world.

This viewpoint was good for a God

of understanding because understanding liked solitude.
S3
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Man, as a communal being, needed more than this solitude.
Man created a social life for God.
54
by giving God a Son.

Man created this ammunity

An other-than-this-world being would

have no idea of what it meant to have a family, i.e., how it
was to love a son, unless he also had a son.

Thus, for

Christians, it was possible for God to understand man's problems, passions, and fears only if he, himself, had a Son
to worry and care about.

A man with no family, for example,

does not know what it means to worry about children.

Thus

the love between the Father and Son was the same as the love
between father and son.

The essential difference between

God and Christ was that one was begotten and the other begot.
If this distinction were removed, then Christ would not have
55
any worth to the religious man.
In other words, for the
man with a family, it was essential that God also have a
family.

In that way God could understand man better and man

would better feel God's love.
One may ask about those men who do not have families,
but Feuerbach said that they do have some feelings about
community.

They all had some sort or sense of family at one

time, thus God's family made them feel better understood.God
begot the Son through the mother because the earthly son
needed the earthly mother.
son loved.

The mother was the first beingthe

For man, as creator of God the Father, andChAst

54
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the Son, the Father had to have a feminine idea to create
the Son.

If God were a separate real Being, he could have

very easily produced the Son out of anything, or nothing.
Since the Father was not a separate being he could produce
the Son only through the female.

The members of the Protes-

tant clergy did not have the Virgin incorporated in religion
and consequently they could marry.

They did not need, from

a practical point of view, a mother in heaven.
mothers here on earth.

They had

For this reason, Feuerbach felt that

the Lutheran religion was much closer to the real essence of
Christianity than the Catholic religion.

However, one must

remember that Feuerbach's idea of the true essence of
Christianity would leave Christianity totally spiritless
and completely worldly.
As one reads the above he may wonder how this position could be called positive by anyone including Feuerbach.
The religious ideas discussed above were seen as basically
true by Feuerbach.

The only problems were the importance

placed on the resurrection and immortality of Christ as well
as concerns about heaven.

Man should have understood what

real human immortality was and that heaven could be realized
on earth.

As mentioned earlier, according to Feuerbach, the

power of Reason, Will, and Affection could not be complete
in each individual but only in the human species.

Thus man

would realize that his immortality was the immortality of
the human species.
The second part of The Essence of Christianity is
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entitled "The False or Theological Essence of Religion."
In this section Feuerbach attempted to demonstrate that if
one considered the attributes of God and man as separate,
then one would be left in a realm of innumerable contradictions.

He also attempted to demonstrate that certain ele-

ments of religion, or theology, led to many contradictions
within the essence of that religion.
The first principle one had to realize was that
The

religion was not, in any sense, an intellectual study.
area that the theologians attempted to reach through the
intellect was not suitable area for study with thought.

Religion was a practical matter and not a theoretical matter.
It was emotional and not intellectual.

56

Evidence for that

fact, said Feuerbach, was that everything considered religious or studied as religious, went against thought.

57

Reason could not allow itself to seriously contemplate
miracles and it could not let itself study anything that was
out of the realm of nature.
these things.

Theology did seriously study

It employed reason to contemplate miracles,

etc., and that procedure was what Feuerbach argued against.
The separation between God and man made by religion
was essentially harmless, said Feuerbach.

However, when that

religion took what was an imaginary, distant, indefinite, and
nebulous being and made it into something that could
56
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theoretically be encountered, then that religion became
harmful."
real.

It took the separation and made it something

By accepting this separation theology distorted

religion even more than before.
This viewpoint of Christian theology, the aspect that
violated reason and humanity, was by no means accidental.
It was, in fact, the essence of Christian theology.

Ac-

cording to Feuerbach, Luther brought this violation unconsciously into the light.

It was apparent that with some

study and consideration this violation could be exposed and
the mystery would be unravelled.

The Catholics, according to

Feuerbach, were still able to disguise this fact.

They had

it wrapped in a veil of mystery that could not be penetrated.
The Protestants were so close to the real essence of Christianity that in some cases they possibly saw the truth, but
pretended that they did not, or they tried to disguise it.59
It was likely that this was the practice that Feuerbach perceived Schleiermacher, DeWitte, the Hegelians, and others to
be following.

They realized the truth, but instead of facing

it, as he did, they attempted to re-veil it in mystery.
Hegel, for example, attempted to turn the truth into a type
of mysticism with the Absolute Mind in the center.
This attempt to study religion with reason brought
"Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 184.
59
John Glasse, "Why did Feuerbach Concern Himself
with Luther?", Revue Internationale de Philosophie 26 (1972):
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out a contradiction between man's scientific knowledge of
reality, knowledge Feuerbach considered real, and his
60
religious imagery.

If this veil were to be dropped, then

true divine knowledge would be revealed.

Divine knowledge

was that knowledge that knew the minutest details, the dis61
If the mystery
tant heavens, i.e., scientific knowledge.
were unveiled, then the theologians would realize that man
created God and not the other way around.

The actual fact

that man did create God did not, according to Feuerbach, take
away the usefulness of God to man.

It was only when man for-

got that he created God and for what reason he was driven to
62
this creation, that he ran into trouble.

Then it was that

he began to deceive himself and mistreat himself in the name
of God and heaven.
By seriously studying this separation of God and man
as set forth by the theologians, one became aware, according
to Feuerbach, of the contradiction in the nature of God's
existence.

As he demonstrated in the first half of The

Essence of Christianity, for God to be God He had to concern
himself with certain things that pertained to man, namely,
Reason, Will, and Affection.

In other words, God had to be

like man or he was not a God to man.

However, if he were too

much like man, he was not a God to man either.

If man made

"H. Frederick Reirz, Jr., "Feuerbach on the Essence
of Religion," Journal of Religion 49 (1969): 181.
61 Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 189.
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God totally supernatural, i.e., with no human attributes,
then God was pointless.

If God was to have value to man,

he had to possess natural qualities.
be accepted by religious people.

This idea could not

Feuerbach perceived that

religion was forever caught in the bonds of this contradiction, the contradiction between the natural and the supernatural.

God had to be within this world but at the same

time out of it, he had to be infinite but at the same time
a particular being, capable of understanding human suffering,
sin, guilt, etc.63

God had to be both a personal being and

a universal being.
Religion set God up as a contradiction to himself.
He was conceived as being non -human, but he was described
and known as a Being that was composed of many human parts.
He was described in human terms.
up against man.

In theology God was set

The essence of God was the essence of man,

but theology separated these divine and human aspects and
64
Religion
made God essentially non -human and supernatural.
thought of God as a spiritual being, but treated him as a
sensuous being.

Theology on the other hand thought of him

and treated him as a spiritual being.

Religion worshipped

the correct idea but recognized it in the wrong being.
Theology worshipped the wrong idea and saw this wrong idea
in the wrong being.

Thus, according to Feuerbach, one had to

eliminate theology and return religion to where it rightfully
63
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belonged.
Religion was not pointless or useless if considered
properly.

It was for this reason that Feuerbach,likeluther,

attacked the old religion hoping that a new one would arise
in its place.

His object was to rid man of theology.

He did

not attempt to dispose of theology by presenting proofs that
God did not exist, and he did not attempt to prove the truthfulness of atheism.

He called atheism negative theology,

and did not believe it could work.

What he tried to do, in-

stead, was to show the uselessness of theology as it currently existed by explaining and setting forth the purpose of
the religious experience.65
Why did Feuerbach perceive proofs of atheism as
negative theology, i.e., as practically useless?

The answer

revolved around his understanding of the nature of proofs.
To use a pfoof, whether to prove or disprove God's existence,
was to presuppose that the object of religion was external.
However, according to Feuerbach, the object of religion was
not external but internal and emotional."
he had to disprove God.

He did not feel

All he had to do was show that belief

in an external God got in the way of the usefulness and purpose of the religious experience.
Theologians wrongly felt that they were obligated to
65Hook, Hegel to Marx, p. 243.
66Donald A. Wells, God, Man and Thinkers (New York:
Random House, 1962), p. 108.
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prove the existence of God.

If God were rather left in the

mind, in the subjective, then theologians would have to grant
Feuerbach's point.

An objective proof, Feuerbach asserted

67
could never be found.

The proof of God's existence was

out of the realm of reason as evident by St. Anslem's proof.
St. Anslem's proof rested solely on the power of reason;
therefore, it was subjective and was not an adequate proof
of the existence of God.

If God could not be proven by

reason, then one had to look to the senses to illuminatehim.
Also, as long as God was separated from man, as the theologians claimed, the only way God could be discovered would be
through the senses.

If he were to be discovered through

reason, then he would not be separated from man.
This attempt to discover God through the senses was
also an impossibility according to Feuerbach.

One did not

see God, feel God, or hear God. He was not an object to
68
God was spiritual existence. Howbe discovered as such.
ever, if his existence were spiritual, then it lay in thought
69
Theologians attempted to say
and was not outside of man.
that God was spiritual existence separated from man.

Thus,

"the existence of God is essentially an empirical existence,
without having its distinctive marks;

it is in itself a

matter of experience, and yet in reality no object of experience.
67Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p. 198.
"Ibid., p. 200.

Ibid.
"

"Ibid.

69
All proofs of God's existence (which were necessary if one
wanted to establish God as separate from man) that came from
reason were subjective; objective proofs, the empirical
proofs, had no object to study.
Feuerbach believed that there was really only one
way a religious person could hope to know God, that is
through revelation.''

However, he found that revelation

also had many contradictions.

Revelation was the revealing

of God and made God an external object, a fact.

However,

to Feuerbach, a fact was not something real and separate
from man.

This view did not mean that a thing did not exist,

but it did mean that for a thing to have any value and meaning it had to stand in a certain relation to man. Its value
72
God, as disand meaning, therefore, depended upon man.
covered through revelation, was thus a fact relative to the
age that was calling him a fact.

"A fact is a

concep-

tion about the truth of which there is no doubt, because it
is not an object of theory, but of feeling, which desires
73
that what it wishes, what it believes, should be true."
The essence of the contradiction in revelation was
not contained in the above, but in the fact that what God
revealed to man was revealed in human terms.

God was not

revealed to men of one nation in the language of another
71 Ibid., p. 204.
72
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nation.

He did not reveal himself to man in the tongue of

an animal.

God was dependent upon man's intellect for His

ability to reveal Himself.

In his belief in revelation man

did not admit this dependency.

He negated his own ability

to know so that God's form of knowledge could be supreme.
This attitude was man's best attempt to negate himself in any
religion.74

Kant limited knowledge so that there could be

room for faith and belief in God.75

Man was willing to admit

he could know nothing about God without God's help.

He

claimed that divine knowledge was nothing other than human
76
knowledge.
All that was revealed to man about God in revclation had human origins.

God could not reveal anything that

was above the man to whom he was revealing it.
restricted by human limits.

God was

God could not go beyond man

because "the contents of the divine revelation are of human
origin, for they have proceeded not from God as God, but from
God as determined by human reason, human wants, that is,
77
directly from human reason and human wants."
Man had only
one way to know God, and in that way man knew only what he
could comprehend about his species.

God had no means of

revealing himself to man beyond man's power to understand,
because what God revealed came from man himself.
74 Claude Welch,
Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth
Century, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale Uniiiersity Press, 1972),
lc
''Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans.
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Feuerbach's argument against man's being able to know
God can be summed up in three statements.

First, if God were

totally spiritual, then he could be known through reason.
However, if reason were the instrument of knowledge, then God
became an element of the subject and could only be known subjectively.

Reason was no proof or means of knowing God.

Second, to avoid the above objection, one could say God could
be known as an external object.

However, an external God

implied that God could be know empirically.
see that this condition did not exist.
heard, or felt.

Yet one could

God could not he seen,

Thus he lacked all empirical properties.

Third, God could still possibly be known through revelation,
bur revelation was relative to the man
in the period in which he lived.

who was receiving it

Revelation was a fact that

had meaning only in relation to the men that considered it a
fact, and it was dependent upon their ability to comprehend.
Therefore, it also was not a method of knowing God.

Feuer-

bach elegantly struck down all the ways that theologians
could speak of knowing God by demonstrating that in the end
all paths led to a contradiction.

No matter how one attempted

to speak of God, if that attempt was such that God was considered separate from man, he would always find that one side
of the definition contradicted the other side. One quality
of God would be offset with another quality to save God from
the realm of man, but in doing so the definition would
invariably contradict itself. 78
78

Ibid., p. 213.

To know God as distinct from man was an impossibility.

Only

when one recognized that God was the projected image of the
human species could he truly know God.
One other contradiction in Christianity that was
considered important by Feuerbach was the contradiction
between faith and love.

This conflict was important to Feuer-

bach because he saw faith as responsible for man's practical
denial of mankind.

Before this discussion can be carried

any further, I must expand on Feuerbach's definition of
faith.

Faith may be defined in many ways.

It may be under-

stood as belief,79 or it may be the feeling of smallness
when confronted by God's greatness, or his love or even his
anger.

Faith is not a concept that can easily be defined.

However, Feuerbach defined faith in the second half of The
Essence of Christianity in a very narrow and particular
manner.

He saw faith as essentially an imperative, as Chris-

tian dogma.

Obedience to the Ten Commandments fell under

faith, etc.

Faith was, according to Feuerbach, that

which made up the conscious form of religion.80

In other

words, faith was that part of religion that was recognized
by the religious people as religion.

With this view of

faith, Feuerbach asserted that it was a product of human
vanity and egotism. 81

Man had faith in God because he was

79
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attempting to buy a place in heaven.

Even closer to home

faith inspired in each man a feeling of being particular.
A man who had faith, according to Feuerbach, felt privileged
in the eyes of God, and therefore above other men and above
82
morality.

The crimes of the Spanish Inquisition, the

Crusades and witch trials were all inspired by what Feuerbach called faith.

Those people with faith felt strong in

the eyes of God because of their faith.
This view of faith was what Feuerbach said contradicted love.

Faith tore man and God asunder, it made God

a

particular being interested in a particular group, i.e.,
that group with faith.

Love brought man and God together,

and it brought men together.
all men were equal.

In the eyes of a God of love

He was a universal God.

Faith brought

disunion to the inner man, it separated him from his species
and this disunion was reflected in the external acts of men.
Love healed this wound and brought men back together again.83
Love was an important element to Feuerbach.

He felt, however,

that theology separated man from his essence, and thus prevented the inherent goodness of man from emerging into social
situations.

If these theological elements that separated man

from himself were dropped, then men would naturally love one
another.

Feuerbach truly believed in Christian morality and

compassion.
82

However, the concept of the Christian God

Ibid., p. 249.

83
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prevented these from growing to their fullest extent in man.
God was in the way merely because man spent so much of his
time concentrating on God that he forgot about mankind.84
If man could recognize his real nature, he would be able
to transfer his love for 'God' to love for man.
If one did re-examine this love, then he would
recognize that divine concepts, such as virtue and morality,
would have value in themselves.

Feuerbach represented one

of those people in the nineteenth century that believed in
Christian morality without a Christian God to give it a
85
basis.
Feuerbach saw the ground of morality as the natural
kinship of man with man rather than of man with an abstract
God."

If morality was dependent upon God for its goodness,

then it would be nothing without God.

Feuerbach called for

a morality for morality's sake and love for love's sake.
Man was good, and if given the chance, would demonstrate
that he was indeed good.
By criticizing Christianity Feuerbach hoped to demonstrate two things.

First, he wanted to show that the real

essence of Christianity was the worship of the human species,
and second, he wanted to show that if this essence were
realized, then heaven could be achieved here on earth. Feuerbach did not attempt to say that religion was pointless.
84
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He realized that there were aspects even more important than
to merely recognize, for instance, that man could love, forgive, and will.

He insisted that these attributes of man

could not reach the ultimate unless they were incorporated
87
in his idea of religion.

However, this religion was not

Christianity or any other god -oriented religion.

It was

Feuerbach's new religion which held man to be the center of
all worship.

If love, forgiveness, and will, for example,

were recognized in that religion, then these characteristics
would bloom to their upmost heights.

In other words, he

recognized certain elements in religion that he considered
true and he tried to hold on to these elements.

At the same

time he hoped to eliminate the false aspects of religion,
the attributing of the truths of religion to a being
separated from man.

Since man really worshipped man, this

88
worship should be direct and not round about.

Feuerbach

called for human dignity in The Essence of Christianity.
By casting off the false aspects of religion and recognizing
the truth of its positive aspects, man

would no longer find

it necessary to humble and degrade himself.

He could and

would rise to his fullest heights in his love forothermen."
87
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As love united understanding and will, it united all that
faith, creed, and opinion separated.

In prayer man expressed

his wishes, wants, fears; asked for forgiveness and felt
forgiven because the love in his own heart forgave and comforted him.

This unalienated man, a logical outcome of Feuer-

bach's critique of Christianity, would be naturally good.

CHAPTER III

CRITIQUE OF RELIGION
After The Essence of Christianity was published
Feuerbach was attacked from all sides.

Theologians and

many philosophers in Germany jumped at him and attempted
to tear him apart.

The Prussian government disapproved and

began to ban his works.

Also, with the appearance of The

Essence of Christianity, the last hopes that Feuerbach may
have had for obtaining a position at a university were
quelled.

Feuerbach felt that, in many ways, his critics

had misunderstood him.

Therefore, in the second edition

of The Essence of Christianity he tried to be clearer and
expand some of his thoughts.

He also included many more

quotations from Luther in an attempt to show Protestant
theologians and the government that what he was saying was
essentially the same as Luther had said three hundred years
before him. 1

Feuerbach was not so presumptuous as to suggest

that Luther had made exactly the same statements as he, but
was sure that if one read Luther from his viewpoint, one
would indeed see that Luther and he were saying essentially
the same thing.
1

Glasse, "Why did Feuerbach Concern Himself with
Luther?", p. 374.
77

78

The second edition of The Essence of ChristianiLy,
however, also came under heavy fire from all quarters.
According to Engels in his Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome
of Classical German Philosophy, only the young Hegelians
praised Feuerbach.

Engels pointed out that Feuerbach was

accepted with great enthusiasm and that his effect was
liberating. 2

Feuerbach demonstrated how to escape the bonds

of Hegel's idealism without ignoring it.

He cut the chains

and swept away the cobwebs.
However, there were some criticisms that Feuerbach
must have considered legitimate because he attempted to iron
them out.

The product of this labor was originally two

works: The Essence of Faith According to Luther, and The
Essence of Religion.

At a later time he expanded The

Essence of Religion in a series of lectures. (These are
published under the title: Lectures on the Essence of
Religion.)
The serious criticisms against Feuerbach came from
two different directions.

First, one came from those who

realized that Feuerbach could be correct in many ways.

Their

attitude was that Feuerbach had explained to them the essence
of Christianity.

Even if this idea of Christianity, as

explained by Feuerbach, were correct, his critics felt that
it was necessary for Feuerbach, to also explain the reasons
-Marx and Engels, Basic Writings on Politics of
Philosophy, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday
El Co., Inc., 1959), p. 205.
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for the evolution of religion.

If Feuerbach were not

successful here, then ultimately his critique of Christianity would not be valid.

Since Feuerbach started his

critique of Christianity with man, his critics felt that
he had left himself in the realm of the subject.

Because

he had no origin for religion, they felt that the possibility
of a divine maker was not eliminated.

All that was under-

cut was a divine maker as described by Christian dogma; he
could be discarded. 3 According to the critics, Feuerbach
was not talking about universal man, but about those men
with whom he came in contact.
subjective desires and wishes.

He was dealing with their
He was talking about

Europeans prior and during his time and not about other men
and other religions.

His critics felt that, since he was

talking about a small group of select men, he could not
assume that all men were the same, and thus there was the
possibility of a true religion somewhere, or the possibility
of one's arising.

If Feuerbach could show a ground for

religion, i.e., a ground that all forms of religion shared,
regardless of the stage of civilization, then he could avoid
this criticism.
In The Essence of Christianity Feuerbach had tried
to demonstrate that the roots of the Christian religion lay
in the socio-psychological environment of the Christian
3
Reirz, Jr., "Feuerbach on the Essence of Religion," p. 182.

SO
Religion became an expression of the Christian
4
One can see that this demoncommunity's wishes and wants.
people.

stration would not be an adequate explanation for some of the
more primitive forms of religion.

Feuerbach realized this

fact and attempted to find a more adequate explanation that
would fit all religions.
The second criticism was one that gave Feuerbach a
more difficult time than the first.
solve it adequately.

He really never did

Even those who originally supported

him, i.e., Engels, Marx, Hess, etc., detected this problem
In The Essence of

and attempted to point it out to him.

Christianity Feuerbach demonstrated what was the real essence
of Christianity.

He showed that God was a rational, loving,

willing being, and that God was all goodness, the supreme
Good.

God possessed all these qualities; therefore, the

species of man contained them also.

How could Feuerbach

connect the individual man, who was not all good, rational,
willing, and loving, with the essence of his species?

Hegel

could not connect the individual man with the Absolute Mind,
according to Feuerbach, and likewise, according to Feuerbach's critics, Feuerbach could not connect the individual
man with the essence of man.

Feuerbach recognized this pro-

blem and attempted to solve it.

However, he finally con-

cluded that it would be forever a source of logical difficulty.

If he did not connect the individual with the species
4Hook, Hegel to Marx, p. 113.
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adequately, he would make the individual an abstract being but if he put everything that was in the species into the
individual, he would end with an absurdity.S

It is absurd

to think that all the good qualities or all the bad qualities
of the species could end up in one individual of the species.6
These were the two problems Feuerbach sought to
solve in his critique of religion.

One can see that the

first critique was primarily a theological one and the
second critique a philosophical one.

He attempted to solve

the first one by finding a common ground for all religion,
and the second one by stressing the individual wishes, wants,
and desires instead of those of the species as he had done
in The Essence of Christianity.'

The Essence of Religion

and Lectures on the Essence of Religion primarily stressed
the first problem, and The Essence of Faith According to
Luther primarily dealt with the second one.

Feuerbach,

however, never really did deal with the second criticism
because he could do nothing with it.

He felt that if he

could demonstrate that Luther's thought agreed with him,
some of his critics would be silenced because eventually
SKamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 55.
6See
Chapter one, page 26 . Feuerbach asked, in reference to Hegel's philosophy, if all philosophy, art, etc.,
could culminate in one person.
Cherno, Introduction in The Essence of Faith
According to Luther, p. 15.
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they would be criticizing their religious father. Feuerbach
r
answered both problems in a theological way and he quietly
ignored the criticisms of his fellow philosophers.
Feuerbach would have been able to avoid the first
criticism in The Essence of Christianity if he had started
with what ne had said was the beginning of philosophy.
In his critique of Hegel he said that one had to begin
philosophy with the senses, but in The Essence of Christianity he began with man and left out much of the sensuous
world.

In Lectures on the Essence of Religion he returned

to the completely sensuous, i.e., nature.

If man were to be

a complete being, then he had to be in direct communion with
nature.

It was only then that he could rid himself of all

supernatural possibilities such as a divine maker outside
the realm of dogmatic Christianity.8

Early in his lectures

Feuerbach stated why he ignored nature in The Essence of
Christianity, and how he was going to remedy the problem.
The Essence of Christianity dealt only with the essenceof man
because Christianity dealt only with man.

The Christian

did not recognize nature in regard to his religion.
Christian did not worship the sun, moon, etc.

The

Because the

Christian believed in miracles, which were antithetical to
nature, the Christian considered himself above nature and
he considered his religion as being anti-natural.
Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion, p.4.
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One can trace the rise of Christianity through man
alone.

However, if one wants to trace the rise of religion

itself, one must look beyond man.

One must look at man's

relationship to nature to find the cause of religion.9

Such

was the goal of his lectures and The Essence of Religion.
To accomplish this goal he had to discover what was the
essence of this relationship between man and nature that
caused man to posit a being outside of nature and worship it.
This reason for religion, Feuerbach felt, was based
on man's feeling of dependency.

He found that feeling of

dependency primarily in man's feeling of helplessness.

Man

was conscious of his helplessness and he realized that in
the face of nature he was nothing and could do nothing without help.

Feuerbach's idea of dependency was not the same

as that of Schleiermacher.

He was not interested in man's

dependency on a mystical being but rather on an empirical
one.10 What was it, then upon which man first felt a dependence?

Man first felt dependent on nature. 11

nature that man first came in contact.

It was with

It was with nature

that he had to live and against which he had to protect himself.

The original dependency on nature was, however, not

just any kind.
of fear.

It was, according to Feuerbach, a product

Fear was that element in man that caused him to

9Ibid., pp. 19-20.
"Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 41.
p. 25.

Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion,
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posit a supreme or greater -than -man being.

An event would

take place in nature that the primitive man would not be able
to understand.

If a boulder fell onto a man and killed him,

chance was not given the benefit for the act.
of some supernatural force.

It was the act

Even when the gods became some-

what personalized, the major gods were still those that produced the most fear in man.

The gods representing the ocean,

thunder, and lightening were the first of the great personalized gods.12

Thor, the first wide-spread god of the

Norsemen, was the god of thunder, and Zeus, the most powerful of the Greek gods, used the lightening bolt as his weapon
to assure himself of his position.

Feuerbach therefore per-

ceived fear as the first essential reason why man turned to
gods.

Man feared nature, but tended to personalize some

aspects of it because nature was also good to him.

Even

those gods that man feared were good to him.

Did not the

rain accompany thunder and lightening?

is one of the

sources of life.

Rain

Did not the savages and primitive people

ask their gods to intervene for them during wars, etc.?

The

source of fear, let us say thethunder god, was also the
source of joy.

Men were joyful when they offered sacrifices

to the gods and the gods did not get angry with them.

Only

when the god was angry did man fear him openly, and when he
was no longer angry their joy would rebound doubled and
tripled.13
1?Ibid., pp. 26-27.

13Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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Fear was not the only basis for religion.

It was

only the beginning, the first form of dependency, since there
were also the elements of joy, utility, etc.

In other words,

man tended to worship that which had the ability to keep him
alive and also take his life.

For example, let us say, there

is a small boy who buys candy everyday, and one day a bully
confronts buy and demands some of the candy.
give up his candy out of fear.

The boy will

He will sacrifice some of his

candy to make the bully pleased.

Is not the sacrificing of

the candy much like sacrifices in religion?

The boy will keep

giving the bully candy as long as he feels that the bully has
his life in his hands.

The bully can either make him happy

or unhappy, harm him or help him.

Let us say that this bully

also obtains candy or other things from five or six of the
original boy's friends and one day none of them show up to
give him their dues.

He goes to look for them and finds that

they are involved in a conflict with another group of boys.
This second group is attempting to take away from the first
boys what the bully considers his, so he intervenes to help
his group.

Thus, the idea of utility is introduced.

The

bully helps when he wants to do so and he is justly rewarded.
Also, if the bully is well known, these boys may just say,
"if you don't leave us alone then we will tell so and so and
he will take care of you."
Religion eventually advanced to this stage of utility.
The pagans were not the only ones that recognized this necessity.

When the Christians ridiculed the pagansthey did not
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ridicule their method.

They attacked only their objects of

The pagans were correct in worshipping that which

religion.

helped them or benefited them but what the pagans failed to
see was that it was the Christian God that was the real beneThis God was the cause of all causes.

factor.

Christians

could understand and accept this fact because they utilized
a thinking process that was much more abstract than the
The pagans were connected to the earth much more

pagans.

closely than were the Christians, so they did not speak of
an abstract god. 14

Augustine, in the City of God, declared

that if a being dwelled in heaven and did not love man or
wished man's happiness, then that being did not deserve man's
15
worship.
God had to be able to be utilized for man's own
purpose.
One can see animal worship developing from the concept of utility.

Man tended to worship those animals which

were beneficial to him.

In ancient Egypt one was punished

by death for killing a cat because there was such a rat problem.

Cats were considered sacred. 16

Persians worshipped

the dog because he protected them from wild beasts and
robbers.17

Feuerbach felt that all of man's religious ideas

were the product of the struggles of both of the species
and individuals with nature, as in the case with the Egyptians
and the Persians.
14

With this view in mind it is easy to see

Ibid., pp. 58-59.

lb Ibid., p. 40.

15Ibid.,

p. 60.

17Ibid., p. 48.
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the rise of nature-gods, animal-gods, and gods in human
form.

18

All of them satisfied some need of man in his

constant struggle with nature.
Feuerbach, however, used the idea of dependency
very loosely. He used it mainly in two ways, in a cognitive
sense and in an emotional sense. The emotional way was primarily man's feeling of helplessness, but the cognitive way
was much more spontaneous.

Man attached himself, according

to Feuerbach, to those things that caught his eye.

There-

fore, there were in some religions, the worship of objects
19
that were harmful to man.

This practice arose because

these objects still satisfied a need in man, the need to
study and to have his curiosity satisfied.
As Feuerbach attempted to show the grounds for
religion, he also attempted to show how it evolved.
other words, he wanted to show how man

In

advanced from primi-

tive religion to a complex religion such as Christianity.

If

he could trace this evolution, then his critique of Christianity would remove all possibility of a divine maker.

In

The Essence of Christianity Feuerbach attacked thetheologizing of religion, and he somewhat repeated this approach in the
Lectures on the Essence of Religion.

Nature religions were

good, as far as Feuerbach was concerned, so long as they
18
Dirk J. Struick, ed. annotated Introduction,
Birth of the Communist Manifesto (New York: International
Publishers, 1971), p. 40.
19Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach,
pp. 41-42.
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recognized man as an integral part of nature. As soon as
they took man out of nature and placed him above it or below it,
then they were harmful. According to Feuerbach, in the process of making nature greater than or less than man, religion
perverted both man and nature. 20 The Hindus worshipped
cattle to such a degree that they would starve before they
ate beef.

This practice, Feuerbach would say, was a very

negative aspect of their religion. Man had to respect nature,
but he could not neglect himself for the sake of a particular
element of nature.

Both nature religions and pantheism even-

tually made too much of nature, and Christianity neglected
21
it completely.
One reason why man may have elected one or
the other of the above approaches was to avoid a feeling of
insignificance.

If, to a god, man could sacrifice al object

of personal value, then the man, as the sacrificer, felt some
personal worth.

Also, if he went in the opposite direction,

to the belief that he was superior to nature and he believed
in a supernatural god, then once again he became significant.
God would then be for man alone and above nature.
There was evidence, said Feuerbach, that neither the
pagans nor the Christians could deal with the idea of being
insignificant. 22 Pantheism could not be accepted because a
pantheistic god was an indifferent god, whereas nature

p. 35.

20Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion,
21

Ibid., p. 37.

22

Ibid., pp. 60-61.
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religions that went to the extreme had to be rejected because
in these man became so overwhelmed with his worship of nature
that the concept of utility was lost.

Man, in that case

where the concept of utility was lost, would be destroyed by
the essence of the being which was the object of his worship.
Some religions allowed their members to be eaten by tigers,
bitten by snakes, etc., and when a member was destroyed, it
was a good and joyful sign. 23
Religion had its foundation in two origins: nature
and man, i.e., the struggle of man with nature.

The first

bit of evidence for its beginning was fear, but that rapidly
gave way to joy and happiness.
into the concept of utility.

From joy one moved very easily

Out of utility, Feuerbach felt

the idea of the one god was eventually born.

An indifferent

god was certainly not a god that had man's happiness in mind
for such a god did not consciously do things for man.

Man's

inability to deal with an indifferent god was a product of
man's egotism, according to Feuerbach.

Brief periods or

moments of egotism might have been alright, but eventually
this egotism got out of hand.

Thus man's ego allowed him

to posit a god that was for him alone and completely supernatural.

This god was the Christian god. 24
Feuerbach also detected and described two different

stages in human history.

In one stage men were primitive and

their religion reflected this condition.
23Ibid., p. Sl.

24Ibid., p. 62.

These men made
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physical sacrifices and worshipped physical gods.

Their

gods, as tangible beings, could be seen, heard, and felt.
The primitive people saw lightening, heard thunder, etc.
They saw physical evidence that confirmed their gods.
second stage of history man became socialized.

In the

He no longer

depended primarily on nature but depended on other men.

In

his socialized state his dependency became something hidden
and secret, that is, in the heart. His god also became something secret and in the heart.

He no longer had a physical

god, and in most cases he no longer worshipped it with
physical sacrifices.

In other words, man's religionreflected

his development within society.
In the ultimate sense, then, it is always man and his
needs that are the ground of religion, the terms in
which it is to be understood. As man changes, religion
changes. Man ceases to be wild, primitive, determined
(as Feuerbach believes) by momentary impressions and
feelings and comes to be governed by laws. Religion,
following suit, ceases to portray nature-gods as arbitrary, capricious, inexplicable—it makes them exercise
understanditlg and reason and subject their own will to
principles.
Monotheism was evidence of man's final liberation from
nature, and his move from focusing on the outer world to the
inner world.26
If one traces the history of sacrifice, one will see
that it culminates in Christianity.

In pagan religions,sacri-

fices were an element of the human ego.
25

A man would make a

Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwil Feuerbach, p. 44.

26Ibid., p. 45.
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sacrifice so that he could appease the gods.

His sacrifice

was an attempt to buy a place in heaven or a place with the
gods.

The pagans had physical gods so they made physical

sacrifices.

In Christianity the sacrifice was still very

real, but its method and means had changed.

"Just as

Christianity had replaced the visible sensuous corporal gods
with an invisible God, so it has replaced visible, tangible
human sacrifices with an invisible, nonsensuous but no less
real human sacrifice."27

Feuerbach was referring to sacri-

fices of the human will or spirit, sacrifices he called
psychological sacrifices.

He felt that there was no differ-

ence between physical sacrifices and psychological ones.
According to Feuerbach, psychological sacrifices were as use8
St. Francis, Feuerbach would
less as physical sacrifices.2
have said was an excellent example of one who made psychological sacrifices.
After Feuerbach felt that he had adequately demonstrated how all religions rose from common grounds, he had to
show why certain elements in all of these religions were
approximately the same, i.e., he had to consider the idea of
good and evil.

To answer this question one can return to

Feuerbach's actual split from Hegel and the advent of his
materialism.

In Hegelian philosophy, all that was real was

considered a product of the Absolute Mind.

After Feuerbach

27
Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion, p.73.
28

Ibid., p. 72.
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turned Hegelian philosophy around everything became merely a
form of matter.

The mind was considered by Feuerbach as

the highest form of matter, but not as something separate
from it. 29

Hegel's being and non-being, thus his Absolute

Mind, had, according to Feuerbach, only theoretical reality.
Feuerbach stressed the fact that thought was a part of man
and therefore man could not be derived from it.

Likewise

man was a part of nature and therefore in turn, nature could
not be derived from thought.3°
considered together.

The body and soul had to be

One could not separate the two as the

Hegelians attempted to do.31
Feuerbach's materialism was the end of his metaphysical philosophy.

He moved out of the realm of idealism

by asserting that nature was that which did exist.

His

thought became much more scientific and he considered
scientific knowledge as supreme.

32

Because of this view,

the sensuous world was considered first by Feuerbach, not man
or God.

Since it was first it could not be derived from any

other source.

Sensibility could not come from human intel-

lect, however the intellect was nothing without the senses.
Intellect had nothing to grasp if the senses did not gather
29
Marx and Engels, Selected Works, p. 373.
30A. A. Mitiushin, "Feuerbach's Philosophy of Man
and the Problem of the Subject's Activity," Soviet Studies
in Philosophy, 12:21.
31Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 285.
32
1-fook, Hegel to Marx, pp. 28-29.
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information for it, and God was nothing but the total of all
spirit.

Therefore God was nothing without the senses. He
Evidence for this

could only be derived from the senses.33

belief was the fact that some of the early gods that man
worshipped were really reflections of his own natural organs
When man worshipped light he was really worshipping the
divinity of his own eyes. The different gods man unconsciously worshipped reflected different organs of his body.
God's power was also derived from nature.

34

The destructive

power in nature was attributed to Him as His power.

God's

infiniteness was a reflection of man's intellect and man's
intellect was an element of nature.
could be, was derived from nature.

All that God was, or
His goodness was derived

from those events that were beneficial to man, those elements
that were, in themselves, good for man.

If a man had good

weather for his crops, then it was because God made it good.
Evil was derived in much the same way.

Man attributed to the

Devil all those things that were, in themselves, harmful to
him.35

All moral concepts were derived in this way, accord-

ing to Feuerbach.

36

Feuerbach felt that he had eliminated all confusion
about his views of religion and Christianity in The Essence
33Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion,
pp. 86-87.
34Ibid., p. 88
35Ibid., p. 111.

36

iIb d., p. 112.
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of Religion, and The Essence of Faith According to Luther,
both works being rather brief.

However, by the time he

delivered his lectures in 1852 he had to accept the fact
that his former works had not silenced the critics.

He spent

quite a bit of time in Lectures on the Essence of Religion
trying tc solve this problem, but an equal amount of time
was spent on restating the essence of Christianity.

The

Essence of Christianity was his greatest work and he never
seemed to be able to get away from it.
Close to the end of his lectures he stated that a
religious man had two roads that he could choose to follow.
By one road he could profess God and deny nature or at least
natural causes.

On this road he would also have to deny man.

By the other he could profess nature and man and do away with
God."
view.

The latter was, according to Feuerbach, the correct
If the latter method were followed, then man would be

able to reconcile religion with the sciences.

Nothing would

be accepted or believed that violated the scientific mind.
If the first road were taken then contradictions between
science and religion would be ever present.

Any form of

abstract science, such as Hegel's phenomenology, according to
Feuerbach, was wrong.

Only the natural sciences had the

ability to restore man to what he should be, i.e., man "with
all his powers and senses."38

Even the pagans understood this

37Ibid., pp. 161-162.
38

Feuerbach, Fiery Brook, p. 285.
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viewpoint much better than the Christians.

They understood

and accepted only that which was confirmed by the senses.
If something were to be considered true, Feuerbach asserted,
then its inner and outer nature had to coincide. 39

In

other words, what man believed and what he gathered by his
senses had to coincide.
Feuerbach believed in the sensuous world to such
an extent that he even thought that the nature of a diet,
for instance, could control man's ability to function.

He

believed that the Revolution of 1848 was lost because of
the potato diet of the German workers."

Feuerbach

declared that man was what he ate.
Feuerbachts critique of religion in general was
posited to defend his critique of Christianity.

He estab

lished the ground of religion but he could not answer the
second objection,
being.

that he had left man as an abstract

As we shall see in the next chapter, that objection

haunted him and was the center of most philosophical
attacks against him.
39 Ibid.
40Hook, Hegel
to Marx, p. 114.

CHAPTER IV
PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUES OF FEUERBACH
Ludwig Feuerbach's works can be treated either as
philosophy or theology.

He insisted that they be treated

as works of philosophy, but at the same time he said that
the overall concern in his works was theology.

Under these

circumstances it seems that it will be valuable to look at
his works in both a philosophical and a theological manner.
By treating his works in both ways, one will see that they
are subject to criticisms from both fields of study.

One

may insist that if Feuerbach could be destroyed philosophically, then there would be no grounds for his theology, and
in some respects this situation might be true.

However,

the most influential philosophical attacks against him, the
ones developed by Marx and Engels, did not accept his philosophy completely, but, in most points concerning his insights
into the illusory nature of religion, they agreed with him.
Likewise, to demonstrate problems .ith his theology may leave
his philosophy untenable.

To really understand the problem

with Feuerbach's works, one must take into account both the
philosophical and theological critiques and attempt to bring
them together.
The object of the criticisms presented in this
96
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chapter will be to demonstrate that Feuerbach's view of man
had some serious flaws.
in several parts.

The criticisms will be presented

First. I should like to point out one

criticism of my own that I do not believe Feuerbach's critics
recognized.

Second I should like to point out the criticisms

from the left wing Hegelians, i.e., Hess, Stirner, Marx, and
Engels, on Feuerbach's view of man.

Third, some discussion

will be presented on his view of materialism as it affects
his ideas of man, i.e., did Feuerbach ever really escape
Hegelian philosophy?

The last criticism that will be dis-

cussed is one pointed out by Nietzsche.

In some ways it has

common points with the first one.
The first objection was touched on briefly in chapter
one.

I do not believe Feuerbach's contemporaries recognized

the implications of this criticism.

It may have been a case

where they were just as guilty as Feuerbach.

In that event,

they would not recognize the existence of a fault at all.
Briefly I must allude to Feuerbach's critique of Hegelianism.
Feuerbach insisted that Hegel's system was circular
in nature.

He insisted that Hegel had presupposed the Abso-

lute Mind and then deduced a proof for it out of that presupposition.

Thus, Hegel moved from a disguised Absolute

Mind to pure-being, and then to non -being, via the dialectic.
Finally, he achieved the fully illuminated Absolute Mind.
Hegel's procedure, Feuerbach insisted, left his system in a
dubious state.

Feuerbach believed that he had avoided tflis

sort of doubt by destroying Hegel's idealism and replacing
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it with his materialism.

However one must ask, did Feuer-

bach really begin his philosophy with the abolition of Hegel's
idealism?

I think not. The disciples of Hegel were becoming

more and more aware of Germany's political plight in the nineteenth century.

Germany existed not as a nation, but as a

group of smaller states.

Its social conditions were becoming

worse and worse, the aristocracy ruled and the workers felt
the aristocracy's heavy hand in all walks of life, especially
in their labor.
It seems possible that Feuerbach's philosophy really
began with the misery of man.

Feuerbach recogni:ed this

suffering and it seems that he asked himself what supported
this misery, what prevented mankind from eliminating the
suffering of human beings? His answer was idealism, especially Hegelianism and Christian theology.
Although his philosophy was not rendered invalid,
several presuppositions, which Feuerbach did not realize he
held, were brought to light.

Just as Hegel began with the

Absolute Mind, and thus presupposed it, Feuerbach began with
the suffering of man and presupposed that man was not meant
to suffer, that is, it was below man's being to suffer,
Feuerbach's efforts tl- roughout his work were directed
toward an attempt to show that the real essence of man was
that of God.

He said he presented the truth of man's essence

by merely putting into sensible language what religion made
mysterious.

If my claim is true, however, then Feuerbach

already recognized man as identical with God, and his look at
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religion was an attempt to demonstrate this hypothesis as
true.

Therefore, he no longer let religion speak for itself,

but imposed on religion what he believed to be truth.
(Barth's critique of Feuerbach in his Church Dogmatics is
similar to this one.)
and God were the same.

Thus, Feuerbach already believed man
He then went about proving the truth

of this belief in the same manner that Hegel demonstrated the
truth of the Absolute Mind.

One can see that Feuerbach's

philosophy may not have been as secure and true ash: believed
it to be, simply because he did not see his own presuppositions.

What the matter finally came to was this: did Feuer-

bach really see Reason, Will, and Affection in all men, or
did he place it there because he felt that all men had it?
It seems that the latter was the case.
as basically good and God -like.
characteristic in mankind.

Feuerbach saw man

He believed that he saw this

My contention is that he did not

see it in mankind but merely placed it there.

Because of his

assumptions, Feuerbach enabled himself to posit certain ideas,
about man that might not, and, as one looks at twentieth century man, do not seem to be valid.
Feuerbach's view of man was also at the center of
the criticisms of his fellow philosophers.

Feuerbach recog-

ili:ed the alienated human being that Hegel pointed out, but
he did not believe that Hegelian philosophy eliminated this
alienation.

Hegel's idealism merely disguised the alienation

by placing its essence in the realm of Mind.

Feuerbach

believed, however, that by turning Hegel's philosophy around
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and exposing its hidden truth, he would have the key to
eliminating this alienation.

As was demonstrated in The

Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach believed he had returned
man to man.

Two questions in The Essence of Christianity,

however, were not answered adequately by Feuerbach, according to his critics.

These two questions brought forth the

greatest probl ,m Feuerbach had with his philosophy and they
lay close to the heart of most of the philosophical criticisms
of his work.

The first question was how did Feuerbach deal

with the infinite when finite man was limited.

The second

question was how did Feuerbach deal with the problem of death.
One will see that these two questions also lay at the heart
of most theological critiques of his work.

Feuerbach an-

swered both questions with the help of his concept of "Speciesbeing."

Man was a species-being; therefore his species was

at the center of his thought and essence, according to Feuerbach.

Although the individual man was finite, the species

itself was infinite, and although the individual man would
die, the immortality of man would be realized in the infinite
life of the species through history.2

Feuerbach centered all

his thought around the human species, i.e., human nature.
Instead of asserting God, Absolute Mind, or Ego as the
'
Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 83.
"A. Robert Caponigri, A History of Western Philosophy,
5 vols. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971),
5:66-68.

in'
abstract element of idealism, he postulated "human nature"
as that element.

However, and this is the key to the criti-

cisms, he could do nothing with human nature after it was
deve1oped.3

Human nature was as foreign to the individual

man as was God, Absolute Mind, etc.

George LukScs, who is

a contemporary Marxist, said that Feuerbach moved away from
alienation with the concept "God" but left man alienated
with the concept "species."4
Many of the young Hegelians recognized this weak
point in Feuerbach's thought and criticized it.

However, the

outcome of this criticism was very different in most cases.
One critique, developed by Max Stirner, presented a view
which was much like what is now called existentialism.

Many

other critiques also developed along Marxian lines.
Stirner suggested that if Feuerbach's species included
all men, then it must include not only good but also evil.
Feuerbach, however, did not consider evil.

Feuerbach be-

lieved that if man were no longer estranged from himself,
then he would not be evil.

Stirner also suggested that if

Feuerbach tried to place the essence of man, i.e., that which
was worshipped in God, in each individual then he would be
involved with so many individual differences that he would
have nothing.

So, according to Stirner, the key to Feuerbach's

problem was simply that he saw only the good in man and not
3Ibid., 4:145.
4

Georg Lukacs, "Moses Hess and the Problems of the
Idealist Dialectic," Telos (1971) 10:23.
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the evil, and therefore did not recognize the real man.'
Stirner solved this problem by going to another extreme.
His view was that 'I alone exist'.6

With this view the

question of good and evil did not arise.

The individual

could not be alienated from his species and did not have to
fit with the species because the species itself was an
illusion, just as was God.

Stirner felt that Feuerbach's

worship of the human species was just as supernatural as the
worship of those religions that he criticized. 7
Moses Hess also saw the problem, but he moved in a
direction opposite to Stirner.

Feuerbach's man was essential-

ly a religious species-oriented being.

Because Feuerbach's

man was not a social being, Hess felt that he could not and
8
would not exist.
As far as Hess was concerned Feuerbach dkd
not recognize the essential element in man that made him a
man.

Feuerbach recognized only religious consciousness and

not social consciousness.
Feuerbach realized that there was essentially no
reality but human reality, and thus philosophy was the selfconsciousness of mankind.

However, Feuerbach did not realize

the implications of his own thought and ignored much of what
sHook,
Hegel to Mart, p. 167.
6Max
Stirner, "Man as Owner," in Nineteenth -Century
Philosophy, ed. Patrick L. Gardiner (New York: The Free Press,
1969; London: Collier -Macmillan Limited), p. 260.
7Hook,
Hegel to Marx, p. 166.
8
Lukacs, "Moses Hess and the Problems of the Idealist
Dialectic," p. 17.
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was to be considered by others as human reality.9

The major

mode of human reality that Feuerbach realized was religious
belief and religious history.
cause of man's alienation.

He felt that religion was the

If man wanted to become a com-

plete human being, he would have to get rid of all religion
and ideology that separated man from himself.

After this

separation was complete social change could take place. Marx
felt, that socio-economic history was the cause of both
religion and alienation in man."

According to Marx, Feuer-

bach saw only the theological aspects of Hegel's estrangement
of man and not the socio-economic or historical aspects.11
Feuerbach left out those aspects of man and misrepresented
man altogether.

Feuerbach recognized the fact that philosophy

depended upon the age and upon all previous philosophies from
which it was developed.

However, according to Marx, since

Feuerhach's philosophical eyes recognized and compensated for
development only through religious history, he did not see
the world through the eyes of the real man.

Marx's real man

was the man that realized that all aspects of history, including philosophical and religious history, were based on
man's socio-economic conditions. 12
9Dieter Turck, "Action vs. Contemplation: On Marx's
Conception of Philosophy," SoutFWestern Journal of Philosophy.
3:67.
10- Gagern, "The puzzling Pattern of the Marxist
Critique of Feuerbach," p. 140.
11Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, p. 125.
12Ibid., p. 182.
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Feuerbach therefore does not see that the
'religious sentiment' is itself a social product, and
that the abstract individual whom he analyzes belongs
to a particular form of society.13
Because Feuerbach did not recognize man in his socio-economic
14
history, he did not recognize the real man.

Feuerbach

also could not explain his man in terms of the infinite.

As

stated above, he could not place the infinite in the individual.

However, Marx felt that he could solve this problem by

positing the social man. 1 5
The criticism from the Marxian school tends to point
to the fact that Feuerbach overlooked the

socio-economic

historical position of man in his own existence.

From this

point of view, he was as guilty of what he accused Hegel, as
Hegel was himself.

Since Feuerbach could not connect the

individual man with his species, he was left with man as a
being that was isolated from other men.
Feuerbach resole, the essence of religion into
the essence of man. But the essence of man is not an
abstraction inherent in each particular individual. The
real nature of man is the totality of social relations.
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticismof
this real nature, is therefore obliged:
1. to abstract from the historical process, to
hypostatize the religious sentiment, and to
postulate an abstract--isolated--human
individual;
13Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach," in Nineteenth-Centur_21
Philosophy, ed. Patrick L. Gardiner (New York: The Free Press,
1969); London: Collier -Macmillan Limited), p. 282.
14Marx and Engels, Basic Writings, p. 386.
15
Paul Tillich, Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology (New York: Harper & Row
Va-Mhers, 1967), p. 140.
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2. to conceive the nature of man only in terms
of 'genus' as an inner and mute universal
quality which unites the many indi\qduals in
a purely natural (biological) way."
Feuerbach's 'I and thou' was recognition that man was isolated, just as the process of thinking also was a form of
this recognition"
. In thinking, one thought that which could
only be confirmed by others.

Therefore a thinking being

realized he was separated from the rest of reality.

At the

same time, since he did think, he realized that thinking
itself was separated from the rest of reality.

Thus Feuer-

back ended with a philosophy of contemplation and interpretation.

17

As Marx stated inthesis number six, the only

true connection between individuals was the connection between the '1 and thou'.

This was primarily the connection

between male and female and it could be easily reduced, as
Marx did, to biological connections.
no other means to be together.
Feuerbach should go further.

Feuerbach left man with

Marx hoped and felt that
Feuerbach got preoccupied with

religion, according to Marx, and did not advance far enough,
i.e., to the concept of praxis.

Marx wanted philosophers to

change reality and not merely accept it or observe it. 18 "The
philosophers have only interpreted the world in differentways
the point is to change it."19
16

Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach," p. 282.

17T

urck, "Action

vs. Contemplation," pp. 64-65.

18Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, p. 101.
19Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach," p. 283.
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It may he the case that if Feuerbach had been able
to escape all the bonds of Hegelian idealism he would have
solved his problem, but to escape Hegelianism would have
meant that Feuerbach would have had to present a completely
different view of man.

Feuerbach's view of the species was

essentially on a slightly deflated plain from Hegel's
Absolute Mind.

Feuerbach's species still floated around in

the realm of idealism, but it was close enough to earth that
However,

the idealistic tendencies of it were well hidden.

since Feuerbach's philosophy did grow out of Hegelianism,
it naturally showed a "broad structural resemblance" to the
'0
Feuerbach's view of morality which was,
Hegelian system.
based on man's relationshipto man, hns in reality based on love.
This love, man's love for man, however, was not something
that could be found in the materialistic world.

It was

something posited by Feuerbach from outside the world, i.e.,
from the mind.

Since his "love ethic" was an element of

idealism, his philosophy could be reduced to that.

21

Feuer-

bach held a form of idealism, well disguised with materialistic terms and ideas.

Feuerhach did not attempt to abolish

religion but to create a new religion.
had as its basis the species.

This new religion

The concept of species was as

idealistic, with all it constituted, as was the older concept
20
71

Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, p. 92.

Lukacs, "Moses Hess and the Problems of the IdealiA
Dialectic," p. 17.
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of God.22

In the end one could conclude that Feuerbach was

still very much Hegelian and an idealist.23
Feuerbach was also indirectly attacked by Nietzsche.
Nietzsche attacked all who held to Christian morality without a Christian God including G. Eliot, who made the English
translation of Feuerbach's second edition of The Essence of
Christianity.

"When one gives up the Christian faith, one

pulls the right of Christian morality out from under one's
feet.

This morality is by no means self-evident."24

Christianity was, according to Nietzsche, a complete system
and when one part was taken away it would entirely collapse. 25
This aspect to which Nietzsche referred was essential, I
believe.

If Nietzsche's criticism was changed slightly, it

would take one hack to the original criticism that was stated.
Feuerbach never attempted to defend his view of man.

He

never said why man should be as he was, i.e., good, rational,
species -being, etc.
like that.

Feuerbach's claim was that man was simply

Because Feuerbach perceived man as being basically

good, he could very easily posit a view of morality that was
based on man alone.

Feuerbach simply posited man as a

72
- Marx and Engels, Basic Writings, p. 378.
23
Turck, "Action vs. Contemplation," p. 63.
74_
- Frederick Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols," in
The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and Introduction by Walter
Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), p. 515.
25 .
Ibid.
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naturally moral being.
As one can see, Feuerbach was justly accused of
misrepresenting man.

Although he felt that he had shown

man how to become unalienated, he did not do this.

If

Feuerbach's view of man is false, and there seem to be many
aspects of twentieth century man that lead one to this conclusion, then Feuerbach's philosophy will fall.
of man with God stands empty and silent.

His equating

All the content

that implied this equality has been lost to twentieth century
man.

CHAPTER V
THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF FEUERBACH
As one can see from the previous chapter, Feuerbach's philosophy stands on a shaky pedestal.

Because

Feuerbach's view of man was unsteady his theology was also
rather dubious.

Theologically, one may attack Feuerbach

for a variety of reasons such as his use of religious
language or his view of man, for instance. 1

In this

chapter I wish to discuss only two aspects of criticism
against him.

The key to all of Feuerbach's work, whether

theological or philosophical, was his view that human nature
and divine nature were identical.2

Therefore, I would like

to concentrate on his view of man and subsequently his view
of God.

Probably more than any other theologian, Karl Barn,

a German, has criticized Feuerbach in a number of ways.This
chapter will be based largely on his work.
Barth's criticism can be divided into two parts.
First, Barth attacked Feuerbach's view of man, and pa-,
- tulated
that man could only know God through God's grace. Second,
'See Lawrence C. Foard, "A Problem in Ludwig Feuerbach's Theory of Religious Language," Religious Studies 9
(1973): 457-461.
2
Peter Preuss, "Feuerbach on Man and God," Dialogue
11 (1972): 204.
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he criticized Feuerbach's view of man's competence to
question God.

I believe both of Barth's critiques are

valid, and show his very good understanding of Feuerbach.
Because Feuerbach believed that man's essence and
God's essence were identical, Barth felt that to effectively
attack Feuerbach one had to demonstrate that they were not
the same.

Therefore, he did not try to defend Protestantism,

theology or religion, but tried to propose a view of man that
would be more compatible with twentieth century man.

Feuer-

bach's view of man was based on a nineteenth century form of
thought that portrayed man as basically good.

Barth did not

attack Feuerbach's reading of Protestant theology because he
felt that Feuerbach's interpretation was essentially correct.
In fact, he used Feuerbach's thought to attack other theologians that he felt were guilty of misrepresenting God.

If a

theology began with man, in any sense whatsoever, then it
would ascribe predicates of man to God. 3 Feuerbach attempted
to eliminate theology completely and to rearrange religion
so that it would be compatible with his view of man.

Barth,

in his critique of Feuerbach, separated religion and theology
as Feuerbach did, but then Barth proceeded to attack religion
and restate theology.

Barth placed his strength and belief in

faith, which was an element of theology.
and would always be, essentially a lie.

To him religion was,
Bonhoeffer, who was

3
John Glasse, "Barth on Feuerbach," Harvard Theological
Review 57 (1964):76.
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influenced by Barth, also recognized that religion was essentially wrong.

However, he went even further than Barth and

attempted to eliminate all forms of ideology in theology.
There has been some speculation that much of his Letters
and Papers from Prison are an answer to Feuerbach.4
Because Bonhoeffer wanted to de-ideologize theology, he
attacked Barth's position of "take it or leave it" revela
tion.

He did feel, however, that Barth was correct in at-

tacking religion.S

From the above discussion one can see

that there was a basic difference among the approaches to
theology of Bonhoeffer, Barth, and Feuerbach.

Feuerbach

started with man and thus saved the human elements, i. e.
religion, whereas Barth and Bonhoeffer intially started with
God and retained theology.
Although Barth's procedure might have been a "take
it or leave it" position, it seems that he was still essentially correct.

If one accepted any view of Christian

mysticism, one would see that the mystics had no choice in
the matter.6
41-lenry Moltu, "Feuerbach and Bonhoeffer: Criticism
of Religion and the Last Period of Bonhoeffer's Thought,"
Union Seminary Quarterly Review 25 (1960):8-9.
SDietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from
Prison, ed. Eberhard Bethge and trans. Reginald H. Fuller
(New -York: The MacMillan Company, 1953), p. 168.
6Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and
Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1963), p. 218.
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Although Barth was not a mystic, this view of mysticism
was in no way incompatible with his view.
Barth also used Feuerbach's thought in opposition
to Feuerbach, himself.

In Feuerbach's account of the 'new'
He would

religion, man would no longer deceive himself.
recognize his real essence and accept it.

All religions

before his, Feuerbach felt, led man to be false to himself.
Man told himself that he was evil, weak, etc., and that God
was good, strong, etc.

Barth felt that man, even in Feuer-

bach's new religion, would still be a liar.

7

Man did not

know God's essence and would never know it without God's
help.

In other words, the only time man would stand in an

honest relationship with God, with himself, and with other
men was when God revealed himself to man and man accepted
the revelation as such.

(I shall answer Feuerbach's criti-

cism of revelation shortly.)
The key to understanding Feuerbach's man, Barth
felt, was the fact that Feuerbach, when positing his man,
did not recognize death or evil in man.

If one realized

that man was evil and that he had to die, then one would
not and could not seriously insist that man and God were
8
As one studies or observes twentieth century
identical.
man, one will recognize that it is absurd to attribute the
notion of goodness to man.

There is enough evil in man to

conclude that the deification of manis,indeed,preposterous.
7Glasse, "Barth on Feuerbach," p. 79.
8Barth, Forward in The Essence of Christianity, p.
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As Bonhoeffer said and Barth agreed, only God could furnish
9
Man was not
answers to questions about death, guilt, etc.
in the position to answer questions about salvation, immortality, and his place on earth.
When referring to Feuerhach's work, Barth did not
explain what he meant by death.

However, Feuerbach did

recognize death in the individual.

"I know further that I

am a finite mortal being, that I shall one day cease to be.
But I find this ver>. natural and am therefore perfectly
10
Feuerbach explained the
reconciled to the thought."
immortality of the human species via the infiniteness of
the life of the species throughout history.

What Feuer-

bach did not recognize was the possibility of man's extinction.

It may be that only in the turbulent and

troubled twentieth century does this possibility present
itself.

Present-day man is decidedly different from the man

that Feuerbach described and understood.

Feuerbach had no

basis for suggesting that the existence of the human species
would not be forever.

In fact, the immortality of man was

important to his philosophy and theology.
As stated in the previous chapters, Feuerbach
attacked a conceptualized knowledge of God.

His claim was

that man did not gain knowledge of God through man's own
activity, hut merely gained more knowledge of mankind.

To

9Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p.195.
10Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion,p.
36.
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a degree Barth re-emphasized this point.

Although Barth

felt that man did not gain knowledge of God as a conceptualized being, he claimed that there was still a God
that could impart knowledge to man.
depended solely on God and not man.11

True knowledge of God
Barth said that if

one wanted to do away with Feuerbach, one had to admit that
in the face of God one was always a liar.

One always de-

ceived oneself about the nature and truth of God.

However,

if one could admit that through religion he cannot know
God and that his knowledge of God is only through God's
grace, then he could dispense with Feuerbach.
Barth's second criticism arose directly from his
first.

It was based on his Christology, but it again dealt

with Feuerbach's view of man.

Feuerbach asked certain

questions about God and Christ that Barth tried to answer.
He also tried to answer the implications of those questions.
Is this supposed Prophet, who supposedly speaks to us
and to whom we supposedly listen, anymore than a
speaker fashioned and instituted by ourselves in order
that by His imaginary existence we may affirm and
strengthen ourselves, yet without His really saying or
our hearing anything but what we put on His lips and
thus say to ourselves?12
Such a question as the above was representative of types
asked by Feuerbach.

Care had to be exerted in answering

11

Niebuhr, Schlermacher on Christ and Religion,
pp. 178-179.
12Barth, Church
Dogmatics, trans. G. W. Bromiley,
4 vols. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1961) 4, 3, 1:72.
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such a question, or one would end by agreeing with Feuer13
One could not have
bach whether he intended to or not.
begun the answer from the point of view of man but had to
start with God.

In other words, one had to ask who really

posed religious questions, or who had the competence to ask
religious questions.
Who is it who asks whether it is really the case that
in the witness of the Old and New Testament we have,
not merely an example and analogy of the witness which
we can give ourselves, but the reproduction and propagation of a self-witness which precedes and transcends all our se1f-witne§1 and by which all our selfwitness must be oriented."
If one believed that man could ask questions like
the above, then he uould reach the same conclusions as
Feuerbach, according to Barth.

It would be obvious that

one would be attributing to the concept of God only those
predicates that one first predicated to himself.
God's properties would be ascribed to Him.

Thus, all

Just as many

others had done, Feuerbach defined God in human terms,
because he thought man to be equal to God.

He did not ask

himself if man should ask such questions about God as the
one above.

If man did have the right, then, according to

Barth, God would not be the light.

Because man felt that

he did have the right to ask questions about God and then
answer them, it was obvious that man could only ascribe to
God the majesty he had already ascribed to himself.15
13
Ibid.

14

iIb d., p. 73.

1S

Ibid.
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Man was in no position to think that he could
prove the existence of God.

If God were the first cause,

the Almighty, then it was not necessary that man assert
Cod's existence.

If man had the ability to prove or dis-

prove God, then he had raised himself essentially to God's
level.

God's existence and truth could only be known

through His grace and revelation.

Revelation, Feuerbach

said, was dictated by man because God had to reveal himself
Surely God did impart knowledge to

to man in human terms.

man through man's own intellect, but this act was not a
reflection on God.

It was a reflection on man.

A teacher,

if he wishes to be beneficial as a teacher, can only lecture to the students on their own level.

Likewise, because

man was limited, God chose to reveal himself so that man
could understand Him.

(Note:

In some cases God does seem to

illuminate himself in terms that all men do not and can not
understand.

Is not the mystic, superior to other men, in a

situation such as this?

God confronts the mystic in terms

that other men can not understand.

The mystic then has to

return to the level of man and attempt to teach what he has
learned of and from God.)
It is not man but Christ, as mediator between God
and man, who is really asking the questions.

Christ asks man

if he will accept Him as the revealer of God.16

Feuerbach,

however, seemed to be asking the reverse of that question.
It is evident that Feuerbach was asking, should one accept
16 Ibid., p. 77.
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Christ as the revealer of God?
different than man?

Should one accept God as

Feuerbach defined man as a being who

was capable of placing God on a throne or taking him off of
it.

However, he did not show why man had this right.

According to Barth, man could not question God.
For Feuerbach to be able to ask his question, he
had to deny the truthfulness of both God and Christ.

If

one accepted God and Christ as given, one would not be able
to ask such questions.

17

One can know the truth of divine

existence through God's grace.
Grace is the election and action of God which is
not to be expected or demanded by man, which cannot
be provoked, let alone projected or produced by him,
but simply comes to him, which affects and determines
him, which is quite undeserved but addressed to him
without and in spite of his deserving.18
God revealed his grace to man in much the same way as God
addressed himself to the Christian mystic.

The mystic did

not choose or ask God to let him become a mystic.

God

drew the mystic in and the mystic had no choice in the
matter. 19
Barth's criticism against Feuerbach was effective
and, when the common elements between it and some of the
philosophical criticism were placed together, Feuerbach
could be silenced.

Feuerbach did, from the beginning of

his philosophy, presuppose a man that was equal to God.
17
Ibid., pp. 80-81.

18

Ibid., pp. 81-82.

19Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and
Religion, p. 220.
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Herein lay the problem with his thought.

He had no reason

to presuppose such a man, to suppose that all men were equal,
good, and identical with God.

Because he did accept this

position, he could have no God but the one he created.
The gaining of knowledge about God through revelation, divine grace, or mystical experience is a legitimate
way of learning to know God.

Furthermore, these methods

illuminate the fact that God and man are not identical.
If, from this argument, man and God are not one, then
Feuerbach does not ultimately have anything to say about
the nature of God.

CONCLUSION
The intent of this work has not been an attempt
to cover every aspect or every influence of Ludwig Feuerbach's thought.

Rather, this study has been, basically,

a look at Feuerbach's work in theology and consequently
his view of man.

Hopefully, it will enable one to have a

better understanding of Feuerbach's thought and position.
Although, ultimately, Feuerbach's philosophy and
theology must be rejected, his insights into the nature of
man and religion are very important.

His place in the

history of philosophy should not be ignored.

Feuerbach's

method as a philosopher was not like that of Hegel.

Feuer-

bach was not a system builder and did not attempt to be one.
He invited others to open their eyes and see the world,
and to study nature and man in a scientific way.1

Feuer-

bach proclaimed a "senito ergo sum" instead of a "cogito
ergo sum."2
Theologically, Feuerbach's influence may still be
seen.

His thought is reflected, for example, by the radical

secularization theologians, the death -of-God theologians
1

Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, p.149.

7
li0Ok,

Hegel to Marx, p. 225.

11 9
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and the writers of the humanist manifestos.3

In instances

such as these, one could say that Feuerbach won.

His con-

cerns for humanity, and not God or heaven, are alive in
these groups today.
Also, Feuerbach's challenge to theologians still
is important.

He brought forth several questions that

theologians still have difficulty answering.

Bonhoeffer

said that Feuerbach asked the theologians to prove the
truth of their statements, and to dictate how theology
would agree with real human life.

4

However, theologians

still cannot, in many cases, show how theology will accord
with every day life.

With this situation, man is even now

very much alienated from himself and others.
Along philosophical lines, Feuerbach's influence
is much stronger but not always recognized.

Many of the

existentialists and Marxists, such as Stirner, Kierkegaard,
5
Hess, Marx, and Engels, were all influenced by Feuerbach.
He showed them how to advance beyond Hegel by opening holes
in Hegel's system that they could grasp and expand in their
own directions.

Feuerbach's critique of Hegel convinced

Marx that he should return to Hegel and de-mythologize him.
Marx approached this problem in a Feuerbachian manner.
3
Peter Hebblethwaite, "Feuerbach's Latter:
Lesek Kolakowski and Iris Murdock," Hythrope Journal 13
(1972):143.
4
Moltu, "Feuerbach and Bonheoffer," P• 5.
SIbid., p. 2.
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Feuerbach's philosophy did not replace Hegel's system.
However, in many ways, Feuerbach pointed out the truth of
6
Hegel's system, truth that Hegel himself did not see.
Marx saw this truth, returned to Hegel, and applied Feuerbach's method to all of Hegel's thought.

Feuerbach's con-

clusions in themselves did not influence other philosophers.
It was his method, i.e., his quick insights into the nature
of religion and Hegelianism that did produce an influence.
If one wanted to seriously study the evolution of Marx's
thought he would have to first study and understand Feuerbach. 7
Not many of the philosophers, after Feuerbach, saw
religion as a projection of man's own nature, but they did,
with the help of Feuerbach, see religion in a different
light.

Marxists saw it as a form of ideology that was used

to reinforce class interests, Freud saw it as an illegitimate strategy of human drives and desires, and Nietzsche
saw it as a "vampire-like-idol" that drained away all of
8
man's strength.
Without Feuerbach these thoughts might have been
presented eventually, but with his philosophy to point the
way, it was much easier for others to find the path.
6Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl
Marx,pp.97-98.
7Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach,p.1SO.
8
Moltu, "Feuerbach and Bonheoffer," p. 9.
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Although, in many cases, nineteenth century philosophers
might not have been aware of whom they were following,
Feuerbach was an important element in their study of the
transition from Hegel to much of modern existentialism and
Marxism.
One might say of Feuerbach....that his thought is
much like a series of lightening-flashes on a dark
night, illuminating for those who already had some
conception of the way but only blinding and confusing
for those who had not. Those who did see had to find
the rest of the way for themselves.9
9Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach,
p. 149.
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